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ABSTRACT  
 
 
In recent years, increased attention being given to accountability on public 
finances in South African municipalities saw an increase in the number of 
municipalities establishing Municipal Public Accounts Committees (MPACs) 
to address deficiencies and gaps in the local government accountability 
mechanisms and oversight. The purpose of the study was to establish the 
alignment between the recently established MPACs and the generally 
accepted public accounts committees with respect to the institutional 
design, practices and performance assessment.  
 
A qualitative case study of the Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan 
Municipality (NMBM) MPAC was followed where documents were analysed 
and semi-structured in-depth interviews with purposively selected 
participants were conducted.   
 
This research study revealed some gaps in the alignment of the NMBM 
MPAC to the generally accepted public accounts committees. The most 
crucial gap that emerged pertained to the mandate and powers of the 
NMBM MPAC. Recommendations for enhancing the financial oversight of 
the NMBM MPAC were made.  The study also suggests further research on 
a larger number of municipalities. 
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CHAPTER ONE  
 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND  
 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
South Africa is expected to provide all its citizens with quality public 
services in response to the legacy of inequality and socio economic 
underdevelopment. The three spheres of government and the respective 
organs of state are required to provide coherent, accountable and effective 
administration by the Constitution of South Africa.  The legislative, as well 
as the executive authority of the municipality are vested in the council of a 
municipality. The municipal sphere is therefore expected to have in place 
effective oversight mechanisms over service delivery and the expenditure 
of public funds 
 
This chapter introduces the study on enhancing financial oversight of the 
public accounts committee in the Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan 
Municipality (NMBM). It provides the background to the study, the problem 
statement, the purpose of the study, research questions, research 
methodology and the research report outline.   
 
1.2 BACKGROUND 
 
Municipalities in South Africa operate by means of budgets that are passed 
by their municipal councils as required by the Municipal Finance 
Management Act of 2003. They are therefore expected to account for their 
activities at the end of the financial year by producing annual reports and 
tabling them in their councils.  
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Before the budget is passed, the political head of the municipality presents 
a budget and detailed plans that are considered and then approved by the 
council. At the end of the financial year, the political head of the municipality 
tables the annual report in the council. The annual report is a document that 
presents an account to the council of how public funds were utilised by the 
executive of the municipality. Processes and mechanisms of reviewing 
whether the budget was indeed utilised according to the wishes of the 
council and according to the legal framework are still emerging and hence 
are not well established in the South African Local Government. 
 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa charges the national and 
provincial legislatures with the responsibility of establishing systems that 
enable them to ensure that government is accountable to them and to 
maintain oversight of government action. According to Senay and Besdziek 
(1999, p.12), prior to 1994 parliament played a minor oversight role at the 
national level and none in the provinces as there were no legislative 
institutions. Hence there are no significant South African lessons from the 
apartheid era. In the case of municipalities, accountability and oversight 
mechanisms are not elaborated in the South African Constitution.  
 
Some pieces of legislation and various guidelines have been developed 
to guide accountability and oversight mechanisms in municipalities. 
However, with respect to financial management systems, accountability 
and governance, many challenges are faced by the municipal sphere. The 
big proportion of qualified reports issued annually by the Auditor General 
of South Africa (AGSA) is an indicator of the financial management 
weaknesses in local government. There have also been regular instances 
of civil unrest arising from perceived service delivery failures within many 
municipalities. Interventions in the form of corrective action are urgently 
required to improve accountability and also enhance effectiveness in the 
management of public resources.  
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Committees are appointed as the main mechanisms of oversight at 
national and sub national level by legislatures across the world. With 
respect to financial oversight, public accounts committees are appointed 
by the various legislatures as the core oversight mechanism. The Public 
Accounts Committees (PACs) hold to account retrospectively those 
agencies who are mandated to implement annual plans and priorities with 
public funds. Despite the varying degrees of success, over time PACs 
have built up a reputation as one of the preferred financial oversight 
mechanisms.  
 
This study explores progress in effecting the accountability and oversight 
mechanisms as provided for by the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa (Act 108 of 1996), local government legislation and associated 
guiding frameworks. A case study method was utilised to assess the 
institutional design, practices and the performance measurement 
mechanism of the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipal Public Accounts 
Committee (NMBM MPAC).   
 
The research results pertaining to the lessons arising from policy 
implementation were expected to be significant for South African policy 
makers.   
 
1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
The Constitution of South Africa provides for three spheres of government 
that are accountable and transparent. In addition, it also provides for local 
government that is democratic and accountable to the communities. With 
respect to the national and provincial spheres of government, governance 
arrangements for oversight and accountability are well elaborated in the 
Constitution.  
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These include the separation of powers between the executive and the 
legislature; the oversight role of the legislature over the executive; and the 
accountability obligations of the executive. With respect to local 
government, the Constitution provides for a municipal council that has both 
executive and legislative powers. However, the governance arrangements 
for oversight and accountability in the case of local government are not 
elaborated in the Constitution, a problem that this study sought to 
investigate. 
 
According to Murray and Nizjink (2002, p.103) the South African Parliament 
and the nine Provincial legislatures have established PACs as one of their 
oversight mechanisms over the executive arm of government. The PACs’ 
core function is to satisfy the legislatures that expenditure is in accordance 
with resolutions in the budget vote, the constitution and the relevant 
legislation. According to Stapenhurst, Sahgal, Woodley and Pelizzo (2005, 
p. 4), “public accounts committees are seen as the apex for financial 
scrutiny and have been promoted as a crucial mechanism to facilitate 
transparency in government financial operations”. In addition, Stapenhurst 
et al (2005, p.3) maintains that a public accounts committee is a core 
institution for public financial accountability and that it is a key instrument 
that a legislature can utilise to further strengthen oversight over public 
resources Furthermore, McGee (2002, p. 55) asserts that, “the PAC helps 
Parliaments hold the government to account for its use of public funds and 
resources by examining the public accounts”.  
 
The Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA) that was adopted in 2003 
called for the tabling of an annual report of the executive to the council and 
a mechanism for its review by the council in the form of an oversight report 
that is also tabled to the council. Section 129(4) of the MFMA further 
provides for the National Treasury to issue guidance on how municipal 
councils should consider annual reports, as well as the mode of operation 
and composition of any financial oversight mechanism established to 
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support the council when considering an annual report. In 2011, the National 
Treasury issued guidelines that address the institutionalisation, practices 
and reporting of the Municipal Public Accounts Committee (MPAC).  
 
The advent of the Municipal Finance Management Act and the subsequent 
circulars and guidelines for oversight reports and the establishment of public 
accounts committees has triggered the establishment of such across 
municipalities in South Africa. This is a very significant development as it 
represents a key milestone in the development of financial oversight 
processes and systems for local government. In the 2011/12 audit report on 
South African Municipalities, the Auditor-General (2013, p.147) asserts that 
“the MPAC is one of the most critical role-players in municipal oversight and 
governance and when operating as intended, it should have a positive 
impact on audit outcomes”. According to Khalo (2013, p.579) the 
establishment of MPACs in South African municipalities is meant to “close 
the gaps as well as address deficiencies in the local government oversight 
and accountability mechanisms”.  
 
In their analysis of the data collected in 2002 from fifty-one national 
legislatures in Commonwealth countries, Stapenhurst, Sahgal, Woodley 
and Pelizzo (2005, p.24) found that the PACs’ critical success factors are 
their institutional design, their behaviour and functioning, information 
availability and non-partisanship. In addition, according to the National 
Treasury and the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional 
Affairs (COGTA) Guide for the establishment of MPACs (2011, p.4), “except 
for certain powers regarding subpoena of individuals, MPACs will undertake 
and manage similar functions and responsibilities for municipalities, as 
undertaken by the Standing Committee on Public Accounts in the national 
and provincial legislatures”. However, very little is known about how the 
institutionalisation as well as the operations of MPACs in each of the South 
African municipalities compares with other public accounts committees 
internationally, whether MPACs have the authority to review all previous and 
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current municipal expenditure irrespective of when it was incurred, their 
relationship with the Auditor-General, and whether the MPACs have 
mechanisms in place to measure their performance.  
 
Therefore, this study sought to gain in-depth insights on the progress made 
in the institutionalisation and operations of a Municipal Public Accounts 
Committee. It is necessary for the policy makers to understand the progress 
made in the institutionalisation and operations of the MPAC’s in South Africa 
as they seek to strengthen accountability in municipalities. The results of 
the study build on the recent research on MPACs in South Africa and will 
contribute to the sharing of lessons among municipalities on the practices 
that enhance effective financial oversight and inform policy makers about 
the emerging lessons. 
 
1.4 PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH 
 
The purpose of the research was to understand the progress made in the 
establishment and operations of the Municipal Public Accounts Committee 
in the Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality (NMBMM). The 
insights gained from the research will contribute to the knowledge pertaining 
to the experiences and obstacles faced by South African municipalities in 
the roll-out of Public Accounts Committees at municipal level. The research 
results will highlight possible policy gaps that need to receive attention from 
the policy makers in South Africa and also demonstrate the practices that 
support effective and efficient financial oversight.  
 
Therefore, the objectives of the research were: 
 
a) To assess the alignment between the institutional design of the 
NMBM MPAC and the institutional design of the generally accepted 
public accounts committees internationally;  
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b) To understand the practices of the NMBM MPAC and their alignment 
to the generally accepted public accounts committee practices 
internationally; and 
c)  To understand the NMBM MPAC performance assessment 
mechanisms.   
 
1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
The research questions are the following: 
 
1. To what extent is the institutional design of the NMBM MPAC aligned to 
that of generally accepted public accounts committees? 
2. To what extent do the practices of the NMBM MPAC align to those of 
generally accepted public accounts committees? 
3. What are the mechanisms for measuring the performance of the NMBM 
MPAC? 
 
1.6 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY  
 
Creswell (2013, p.107) defines a research design as, “a set of guidelines 
and instructions to be followed in addressing the research problem”. He 
further believes that the research design enables the researcher to 
anticipate the appropriate research decisions that are necessary so as to 
maximise the validity of the eventual results. A case study research design 
was followed where a phenomenon in the form of a community, institution, 
group or individual is intensively described and analysed (Merriam, 2011: 
p.8). In particular, the researcher sought to understand the experiences and 
perspectives that are prevailing in the Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan 
Municipality (NMBM) Municipal Public Accounts Committee (MPAC) 
pertaining to accountability and oversight. 
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Salkind (2012, p.213) asserts that the qualitative research method entails 
an exploration of processes that underlie human behaviour. In addition, 
Myers (2013, p.9) believes that qualitative research is suitable when 
studying a particular subject in depth, a particular topic is new and 
previously published research is limited.  A qualitative research method was 
therefore deemed more appropriate for this study in order to understand the 
phenomena under investigation from the participants’ perspectives.  
 
The researcher used purposive sampling which is a universal attribute of 
non-probability sampling procedure (Lyon, 2012, p.88). One metropolitan 
municipality was selected by the researcher. Document review and 
interviews were employed by the researcher. 
 
1.7 RESEARCH REPORT OUTLINE  
 
The research report will follow the outline below: 
 
Chapter 1 introduces the research topic and provides a background to the 
study.  
 
Chapter 2 reviews the literature on accountability and oversight by 
addressing the theoretical framework, the conceptual framework, and 
lastly the legislative and regulatory framework.   
 
Chapter 3 presents the research design and methodology that were 
followed.   
 
Chapter 4 presents the Data and its Analysis.  
 
Chapter 5 presents Findings and Recommendations.  
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CHAPTER TWO  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
 
Within the broad oversight process in legislatures, the Public Accounts 
Committees (PAC’s) role is very specific in that it assesses the extent of 
alignment between resource management and policy implementation 
through reviewing and following up on the reports of the Auditor General. 
Academic research should be encouraged in the area of public accounts 
committees as they are key in ensuring effective governance and public 
sector accountability.  
 
In this section the researcher reviews the literature on accountability and 
oversight. This section is divided into the theoretical framework, the 
conceptual framework, and lastly the legislative and regulatory framework. 
The theoretical framework covers the conceptual theory of accountability 
and public accountability.  The theoretical framework will serve as a lens 
in the investigation of financial oversight. 
 
The second part of this section deals with the conceptual framework. This 
literature review will help the researcher to form the basis for his research 
as this review will reveal the already accumulated knowledge in this area. 
A number of concepts introduced by various writers are discussed.  
 
The third part of this section deals with the legislative and regulatory 
framework for the South African municipalities.  
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2.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The theoretical framework forms the underlying structure which can be 
compared to the construction of a new building wherein there is a 
foundation upon which the structure is built. Based on the above 
perception, no single theoretical perspective is adequate for gaining an 
insight into and understanding of financial oversight.  Hence the 
researcher anchored this research project on Lindberg’s (2013) 
accountability conceptual theory and Boven’s (2006) public accountability 
theory as the lens through which to view accountability and oversight in 
municipalities.  
 
2.2.1 Lindberg’s accountability conceptual theory  
 
According to Lindberg (2013, p.209), “the defining characteristics of any 
form of accountability can be expressed in various ways and consist of the 
following elements: 
 
a) An agent or institution who is to give an account (A for agent);  
b) An area, responsibilities, or domain subject to accountability (D 
for domain);  
c) An agent or institution to whom A is to give account (P for 
principal);  
d) The right of P to require A to inform and explain/justify decisions 
with regard to D; and  
e) The right of P to sanction A if A fails to inform and/or 
explain/justify decisions with regard to D.” 
 
These five key characteristics denote the conceptual core of accountability 
in which there is no requirement for codified formal relationships or that 
the agents and institutions involved hold an official office or be formal.  
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The first two characteristics require the transfer of decision making power 
that is applicable to a specific domain to the agent, with the agent not 
necessarily in a public office or democratic. With respect to the third and 
fourth characteristics, there is no requirement for the principal to be a 
product of a democratic process or act in the interest of the public. At its 
core, according to Lindberg (2013, p.210), “accountability necessitates only 
the right to sanction A for failure to provide information and justify decisions. 
The right of P to also sanction the content of decisions and actions by A is 
a possibility that if present adds additional leverage for the P but is not 
strictly necessary for the concept of accountability”.  
 
Lindberg (2013, p.212) asserts that “types of accountability can be 
categorised into three dimensions and twelve sub types:  
 
a)  the source of the accountability relationship, i.e. whether the 
accountability holder, or principal, is internal or external to the one 
being held to account; 
b)  The degree of control which the principal exercises over the power 
holder which can be weak, strong or somewhere in between; 
c)   The spatial direction of the accountability relationship and this can be 
vertical or horizontal.”  
 
TABLE 2.1    Sub-types of accountability  
Source of 
Control  
Strength 
of Control  
Vertical Horizontal  
Upward Downward 
Internal  High  Business Bureaucratic Audit 
Low  Client-Patron Patron-
Client 
Peer 
Professional 
External  High  Representative Fiscal Legal 
Low Societal  Political  Reputational 
Source: Lindberg, 2013 : p.213 
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The twelve sub types of accountability are elaborated as follows:  
  
a) Business accountability – the principal is internal to the organisation in 
the form of shareholders holding to account the executive for 
generating profit, their degree of control is high and runs vertically 
upwards. 
b) Bureaucratic accountability – the principal is internal to the organisation 
in the form of senior managers holding to account the lower levels for 
performance with control that is high that runs downwards. 
c) Audit accountability – the principal is internal to the organisation in the 
form of an auditor holding to account other office holders in the same 
state organisation for prudence with control that is high that runs 
horizontally. 
d) Client–patron and patron-client accountability – informal accountability 
relationship that runs upwards and downwards respectively with a low 
degree of control.  
e) Professional/Peer accountability – internal accountability that is either 
formal or informal among peers that is horizontal and a low degree of 
control.  
f) Representational accountability – accountability in a political 
democratic system with an external principal in the form of citizens 
holding to account their elected representatives in a vertical 
relationship running upwards and a high degree of control.  
g) Fiscal accountability – an external principal in the form of a legislature 
holds to account departments and public entities fiscally accountable 
vertically downwards with a high degree of control. When the 
legislature holds the executive for fiscal prudence, the relationship runs 
horizontally, whereas when Treasury holds other ministries fiscally 
accountable, the accountability runs horizontally.   
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h) Legal accountability – an external principal in the form of various 
judicial institutions holding the public, private sector and public office 
bearers accountable for lawful behaviour running vertically downwards 
with a high degree of control. In addition, there are instances where the 
judicial institutions hold to account other state institutions for the legal 
compliance of decisions and actions with the accountability relationship 
running horizontally.  
i) Societal accountability – an external principal in the form of civil society 
and the media holding to account public and private institutions for their 
actions with a low degree of control and runs vertically upwards.  
j) Political accountability – an external principal in the form of elected 
politicians holding to account the bureaucracy and public agencies for 
performance runs vertically downwards with a weak degree of control.  
k) Reputational accountability – accountability among peers or peer 
institutions for compliance with established norms and are external to 
the agent with low degree of control.  
 
This theory is relevant to this study as it provides conceptual clarity by 
examining the accountability principle which is contained in the supreme 
law of South Africa, the Constitution. Section 1 (d) of the South African 
Constitution provides for accountability, responsiveness and openness as 
founding values of South Africa.  In addition, section 41(1)(c) of the 
Constitution requires effective, transparent, accountable and coherent 
government for South Africa as a whole by all spheres of government and 
all organs of state within each sphere. Furthermore, democratic and 
accountable government for local communities is also provided for in 
section 152(a) of the South African constitution.   
 
In the context of the study, fiscal accountability relates to the municipal 
council holding the executive of the municipality accountable for the 
implementation of its budget, the accountability relationship is horizontal.  
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2.2.2 Public accountability  
 
Bovens (2006, p.5) defines accountability as, “a relationship between an 
actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and justify 
his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgment, and 
the actor may face consequences”. In addition, Bovens (2006, p.9) defines 
public accountability as a “situation in which account rendering is always 
accessible to the public and entails matters in the public domain , such as 
public expenditure, operations of public institutions and private institutions 
funded by public resources”.  
 
Arising from the above understanding, Bovens (2006, p.13) asserts that 
“there are five requirements necessary for defining a social relation as one 
of Public Accountability, and they are 
 
a) account  rendering must be open to the general public; 
b) there must be an explanation and justification of conduct; 
c) the explanation is directed at a specific forum; 
d) the actor (agent) feels obliged to come forward; 
e) there is the possibility of debate and judgement, including (informal) 
sanctions”. 
 
The definition of public accountability provided by Bovens (2006) is 
relevant for the study as it helps to explain the context within which 
accountability is taking place. In particular, accountability in a municipality 
pertains to its conduct as a public institution and therefore account 
rendering has to be open to the public and not be discreet. Furthermore, 
Bovens’ (2006) conditions for a social relation to qualify as public 
accountability are aligned to Lindberg's defining characteristics of 
accountability and are also useful in applying it in the context of assessing 
financial oversight in a municipality.  
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Public accountability as outlined by Bovens (2006, p.9) articulates the 
context and the conditions under which accountability is taking place. In 
the case of the NMBM, account rendering is accessible to the public and 
entails matters in the public domain such as public expenditure and 
operations of public institutions.  Public financial accountability in this case 
entails the scrutiny of the municipal expenditure by the Auditor-General 
and the executive being held to account by the Municipal Council for the 
implementation of the budget by the executive, with the MPAC being the 
instrument of the Council.  
 
Hedger and Blick (2008, p.4) understands public financial accountability as 
an interface of the executive, the legislature and the Supreme Audit 
Institution and composed of two dimensions of accountability, the public 
audit and parliamentary accountability. Public audit is a retrospective review 
of public expenditure by a Supreme Audit Institution whilst parliamentary 
accountability, involves the legislature holding the executive to account for 
implementing the budget in a prudent manner that is aligned the law. The 
public accounts committee in parliament is primarily concerned with 
financial accountability. The public financial accountability seems to be 
consistent and aligned to both Lindberg’s accountability conceptual theory 
and Bovens’ understanding of public accountability.    
 
Hedger and Blick (2008, p.5) asserts that the culture of public sector 
governance in a specific country influences the end objective of public 
financial accountability. The objective of accountability moves beyond the 
identification of inefficiencies and includes establishing their causes and 
providing measures to reduce or eliminate them. In their search for criteria 
for evaluating the strengths and weaknesses in the performance of public 
accountability arrangements, Bovens (2006, p. 24) advances the 
democratic, constitutional and cybernetic theoretical perspectives on public 
accountability.  
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2.2.2.1 The democratic perspective on public accountability 
 
  The democratic perspective assess the extent to which the accountability 
arrangement enhances the options open to the voters or legislatures in 
controlling the executive power. The key indicators for assessing the 
accountability arrangements include the accuracy, relevance and 
timeliness of the information about the conduct of the agents and their 
attitude to oversight exercised by the principal (Bovens, 2006: p.25).  
 
The democratic perspective to public accountability is relevant for the 
study as the municipality that is being assessed pertaining to the 
effectiveness of financial oversight is a democratic institution and therefore 
is supposed to have in place accountability arrangements. In particular, it 
is important to establish whether the accountability arrangements provide 
the democratically legitimate principals, in this case the municipal council, 
with accurate, relevant and timely information pertaining to the 
implementation of the budget that was endorsed by the municipal council. 
Furthermore, it is also necessary to establish whether the executive resists 
or co-operates with the oversight measures arising from the council.    
 
2.2.2.2 The constitutional perspective on public accountability 
 
The constitutional perspective asses the contribution of the accountability 
arrangement to the prevention of corruption and abuse of powers by the 
agent. The key indicators include the environment created leading to 
agents refraining from abusing power and the authority of accountability 
forums with respect to revealing corruption (Bovens, 2006: p.25). In 
addition, Hedger and Blick (2008, p.6) notes that action targeted at 
individuals responsible for the identified financial irregularities  which can 
be in the form of public sanction and punishment are indicators of a 
functioning accountability process and may have a deterrence result on 
public officials resulting in reduced levels of financial corruption. 
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Furthermore, Schacter (2000, p.1) views accountability as a measure to 
reduce the abuse of power that also helps ensure governments operates 
within the regulatory framework as they cannot always be expected to 
voluntarily adhere to the legislation and the mechanisms that control their 
ability to act. 
 
The constitutional perspective to public accountability is relevant to the 
study as the executive of the municipality utilises public financial resources 
on behalf of the citizens to achieve the approved policy objectives. The 
access to public financial resources carries an inherent risk of abuse and 
mismanagement and therefore must be utilised according to the rules and 
in accordance with the wishes of the principal. One of the questions in the 
study is to assess the alignment of the institutional design of the public 
accounts committee of the municipality being studied to that of generally 
accepted public accounts committees, i.e. its establishment, powers and 
mandate, especially with respect to preventing corruption and 
mismanagement through interrogating and revealing it where it exists. It is 
also important for the elected representatives to be clear about the 
centrality of public accountability in an institution of democracy. The other 
question in the study is to assess the alignment of practices of the public 
accounts committee to those of generally accepted committees with 
respect to whether they advance the objective of preventing corruption and 
abuse of power. 
 
2.2.2.3 The cybernetic perspective on public accountability 
 
The cybernetic perspective views accountability as an instrument to 
enhance the effectiveness of individual officials and public agencies in 
fulfilling their commitments thereby achieving desirable societal outcomes 
consistently.  The key indicators in this perspective include the extent to 
which the accountability arrangements provide quality feedback and 
whether the environment created results in officials and agencies revisit 
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the values and assumptions underpinning their policies, procedures and 
organisations (Bovens, 2006: p.26). 
 
The cybernetic perspective to public accountability is also relevant to the 
study as it promotes an environment of learning and revising the initial 
assumptions on the part of the agents rather than being defensive and 
having a negative attitude to the exercise of accountability. In the context 
of the study, the operations of the public accounts committee will expose 
weaknesses and gaps on the part of the executive of the municipality and 
make recommendations on measures to improve the situation. The 
preparedness of the executive to accept and implement the 
recommendations from the council in general and the public accounts 
committee in particular demonstrates a shared perspective with respect to 
serving the citizens in a way that improves their quality of life. For the 
executive of the municipality to adopt a learning attitude from the 
accountability arrangements, it is necessary for the engagement between 
the municipal council and the executive to have a balanced relationship 
that is not overly confrontational but also has substantial aspects of co-
operation towards a shared goal.  
 
2.3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
 
2.3.1 Oversight in perspective 
 
Is oversight the same as accountability? There is a tendency to refer to 
accountability and oversight interchangeably as if they are the same. This 
discussion on oversight seeks to answer the above question. With regard 
to whether oversight and accountability are the same, there is a broad 
definitional literature and perspectives. It is useful to note the following 
definitions and interpretation upon which this study draws.  
 
According to Goudge, “accountability is the obligation to answer for a 
responsibility conferred. When called on to account, a party on whom 
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responsibility has been conferred must explain and justify against a 
criterion of some kind his or her decisions and actions. Oversight is the 
other side of the equation. Once a responsibility has been conferred, 
oversight seeks to ensure that the responsibility is properly fulfilled. The 
overseer must ensure that those who hold the responsibility in fact 
discharge it and are held accountable for their actions and decisions” 
(Goudge, 2009: p.332). Murray and Nizjink concurs with Goudge on the 
relationship between accountability and oversight as they also assert that, 
“the executive is accountable to elected politicians – the legislature – for 
fulfilling its responsibilities. Thus, ‘oversight’ and ‘accountability’ are two 
sides of the same coin – the accountability of the executive to the 
legislature is enforced when the legislature exercises oversight over it and 
scrutinises executive action” (Murray and Nizjink, 2002: p.87). 
 
According to O’Donnell, “horizontal accountability is the existence of state 
agencies that are legally enabled and empowered, and factually willing 
and able, to take actions that span from routine oversight to criminal 
sanctions or impeachment in relation to actions or omissions by other 
agents or agencies of the state that may be qualified as unlawful” 
(O’Donnell, 1999 in Kenney, 2000, p.2).  DFID concurs with O’Donnell in 
referring to oversight conducted by state agencies over others as 
horizontal accountability when they posit that, “horizontal accountability 
institutions are those in which state entities demand answers from (and 
sometimes possess the power to sanction) other state entities. Auditors-
General, anti-corruption commissions, bureaucratic oversight boards, 
Parliaments (e.g. parliamentary committees and commissions) – these 
and other bodies stand in for citizens who generally lack the time, 
expertise, and collective-action resources to monitor the detailed work of 
their public representatives” (DFID, 2008: p.8). 
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The above inputs indicate that oversight is an aspect of accountability, the 
exercise of which is meant to fulfil the accountability obligation by the 
delegate through scrutinising its actions and decisions. Oversight is 
conducted by state agencies who are empowered by the constitution or 
legislation on behalf of the citizens which can be auditors-general, anti-
corruption commissions, bureaucratic oversight boards or parliaments and 
also oversight that is conducted by a parliament or a legislature supported 
by auditors-general over the executive in public accountability 
environments. 
 
Authors define legislative oversight from various perspectives. According 
to Corder, Jagwanth and Soltau (1999, p.4), “oversight is a commodious 
concept that refers to the crucial role of legislatures in monitoring and 
reviewing the actions of the executive organs of government”. According 
to Fölscher (2006; p.3) “legislative oversight is a mechanism for reviewing 
government policies and endorsing, revising or rejecting them before the 
fact or ex ante”.  
 
Legislative oversight according to the National Democratic Institute is 
defined as “the obvious follow-on activity linked to law-making. After 
participating in law-making, the legislature’s main role is to see whether 
laws are effectively implemented and whether, in fact, they address and 
correct the problems as intended by their drafters” (NDI, 2000: p.19).  
Oversight according to this definition is understood as an exercise 
undertaken by legislatures on government actions and policies after the 
policies have been endorsed and does not acknowledge that oversight in 
some instances takes place before a policy is approved.  
 
Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2006a, p.3) suggests that, “parliaments and 
legislatures perform more of an oversight function. They need to evaluate 
the virtues (or the lack thereof) of government policies, to keep 
governments in check, to prevent governments from abusing their power, 
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to assess the merits of governments’ legislative proposals, to examine 
these proposals, and to vote, amend, approve and at times reject these 
proposals. In addition to oversight which is exercised before a certain 
policy is enacted and referred as ex-ante oversight, parliaments and 
legislatures also perform an ex-post oversight function. Parliaments and 
legislatures are in charge of overseeing policy implementation. 
Parliaments need to make sure that policies are implemented as they were 
approved by the legislature”.  
 
.Some scholars broadly agree that oversight that is effective enhances the 
proper functioning of a democratic political system. Others further assert 
that effective financial scrutiny by legislatures reduces the space for secrecy 
thereby reducing for corruption to take place (Wehner, 2003: p.22). 
Parliaments are instrumental in preventing possible abuse of power through 
exercising their oversight function resulting in governments being 
accountable and responsive for their actions according to Pellizo and 
Stapenhurst (2006b, p.17). Furthermore, West and Cooper in Pelizzo et al 
(2006b, p.4) asserts that policies initiated by the executive arm of 
government improve in quality and acquire legitimacy through effective 
oversight and their endorsement by the legislatures.  Finally, Stapenhurst 
(2004, p.6) also suggests that continuous improvements in public financial 
accountability result when weaknesses unearthed by the audit process are 
addresses in future budgets.  
 
According to Pellizo and Stapenhurst (2004, p.4), “parliaments have 
several different oversight tools at their disposal for overseeing the 
executive, such as committee hearings, hearings in plenary sessions of 
the parliament, the creation of commissions of inquiry, questions, question 
time, interpellations, the ombudsman, auditors-general, and the public 
accounts committees”. Stapenhurst (2004; p.1) agrees and adds, 
“Legislative oversight is nowhere more important than over the budget”. 
Werner (2002, p.3) asserts that legislatures interact with the budget firstly 
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when they consider and pass the budget; secondly, when they monitor the 
execution of the budget; and lastly, when they assess whether the 
implementation of the budget was in compliance with the wishes of the 
legislature. The last phase of the interaction with the budget is preceded 
by an audit of the public accounts that is conducted by an independent 
body, in some cases a court or an auditor-general, followed by the 
consideration of the results of that audit by the legislature. Pellizo et al 
(2006, p.6) concurs with the assertion by other scholars about effective 
oversight having a dependency on additional conditions rather than only 
on the mere presence of oversight tools, which are the specific oversight 
powers given to parliaments, the ability of parliaments to modify legislation, 
access to proper information by parliament from the executive, the role of 
the public representatives and the role of the chairpersons of 
parliamentary committees.  
 
Among the challenges around oversight in legislatures, Murray and Nizjink 
(2002, p.8) highlights the lack of clarity among members of the governing 
parties about their role in oversight, perceiving oversight as challenging 
the ruling party and the uncertainty about their responsibility in oversight. 
In addition, governing party members in the legislature tend to understand 
their role as the support to the executive instead of ensuring that the 
citizens receive quality service from their government. In their capacity as 
public representatives, members of the governing party need to realise 
that accountability and oversight are their core responsibilities (Murray and 
Nizjink, 2002: p.87). 
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2.3.2 Importance of oversight  
 
In articulating the importance of oversight, the South African Legislative 
Sector (2012, p.16) suggests that as a mechanism of enforcing 
accountability, oversight is meant:  
a) “To detect and prevent abuse, arbitrary behaviour or illegal and 
unconstitutional conduct on the part of the government and public 
agencies. At the core of this function is the protection of the rights 
and liberties of citizens; 
b) To hold the government to account in respect of how the taxpayers’ 
money is used. It detects waste within the machinery of government 
and public agencies. Thus it can improve the efficiency, economy 
and effectiveness of government operations; 
c) To ensure that policies announced by government and authorised 
by Parliament and Provincial Legislatures are actually delivered. 
This function includes monitoring the achievement of goals set by 
legislation and the government’s own programmes; and 
d) To improve the transparency of government operations and enhance 
public trust in the government, which is itself a condition for effective 
policy delivery.” 
 
2.3.3 Committees as mechanisms of oversight 
 
According to Armit (2004) of the Parliamentary Centre in Canadian 
Comprehensive Auditing Foundation (CCAF) (2006, p.10): “It is in 
committee where the individual MP weaves three strands of an MP’s 
function together: as legislator, reviewing, modifying, amending legislation; 
as overseer, reviewing government policies, programs and expenditures; 
and as representative, hearing the various voices of the citizen, 
representing constituent concerns and reflecting the public interest in the 
deliberations of the committee.” 
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The most established oversight mechanisms that are utilised by 
parliaments across the world are committees. They fall into two main 
categories: those that are granted autonomy by their legislatures as in the 
United States Congress and those that have delegated responsibilities 
with decision-making in their plenary such as the Parliament of the United 
Kingdom (Murray and Nizjink, 2002: p.59). Legislature committees are 
derived from its rules of procedure and act on behalf of the legislature and 
according to the responsibilities given to them focussing on legislation, 
budgeting, inquiry, oversight and legislature management (Friedberg and 
Hazan, 2012: p.11). Griffith (2005, p.39) asserts that through committees, 
accountability is deepened and the foundations of representative 
democracy are fulfilled.  
 
Members of the legislature are assigned to various committees for the 
duration of the term or on a temporary basis to address matters more 
closely and simultaneously. Through their participation in committees, 
members become more knowledgeable on matters within the remit of their 
committees. In addition, the legislatures interact directly with citizens and 
other key stakeholders when committees hold public hearings and also 
open their meetings to the media and the public (NDI, 1996: p.3). 
 
Most legislatures in democratic countries have two types of parliamentary 
committees, those that are permanent and the ones that are ad hoc 
(Friedberg and Hazan, 2012: p.12; NDI, 1996: p.5). The permanent 
committees deal with the legislation and the examination of government’s 
activities and the duration of their operation is the entire term of the 
legislature. In most cases, they focus on a defined specific subject matter 
that is sometimes aligned to the portfolios of the executive arm of 
government. On the other hand, ad hoc committees are established to 
address specific issues on the agenda of the legislature. Their 
responsibilities are determined by the legislature and they cease to exist 
when their task is complete.  
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Griffith (2005, p.11) categorises five parliamentary committees as follows: 
 
(a) legislative review committees; 
(b) Public Accounts Committees;  
(c) estimates committees;  
(d) other select or standing committees; and  
(e) oversight committees for independent investigatory bodies.  
 
This form of categorisation is more specific and it expresses the one by 
Friedberg et al (2012, p.12) and the NDI (1996, p.5) differently.   
 
In the context of South Africa, the committees play a key role in exercising 
oversight over the executive on behalf of their legislature as they have 
delegated powers with the decision-making taking place in the plenary. 
Unlike other legislatures, the powers of committees in South Africa are 
provided for in the Constitution of South Africa and are as follows 
according to sections 56, 69 and 155: “the legislatures or any of their 
committees may: 
 
a) Summon any person to appear before them to give evidence under 
oath or affirmation, or to produce documents. 
b) Require any person or institution to report to them. 
c) Compel in terms of legislation or the rules and orders, any person or 
institution to comply with a summons or a request for a report. 
d) Receive petitions, representations or submissions from any 
interested persons or institutions”.  
 
Murray and Nizjink (2002, p.63) refers to committees as the ‘engine rooms’ 
of South African legislatures.  
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In addition, Murray et al (2002) reports that there are four types of 
committees in South African legislatures, namely the policy committees 
which mostly correspond with government departments; the standing 
committees which deal with the ongoing business of the legislature such 
as rules; ad hoc committees that are formed to address a specific matter 
of importance or problem; and the public accounts committees which deal 
with financial oversight across all the organs of the executive. Some of the 
challenges facing committees in South African legislatures are the poor 
attendance in committee meetings by members, lack of co-ordination 
between committees, lack of mechanisms to monitor the implementation 
of legislature resolutions arising from committee reports, and the confusion 
among some members between the role of oversight and opposition.  
 
In the context of municipalities in South Africa, Section 33 of the Municipal 
Structure Act provides for municipalities to establish two categories of 
committees. The first category of committees are established by the council 
to support it in exercising its functions and powers; it is accountable to the 
council and is comprised of the members of the council. The second 
category of committees are established by the executive committee or the 
executive mayor to support the executive in exercising functions and 
powers, it is chaired by a member of the mayoral or executive committee 
and reports to the executive mayor or the executive committee. 
 
The legal framework does not prescribe to the municipalities on how they 
should structure their committee system and therefore the choice on the 
committee system lies with each specific municipality. Fessha (2008, p.23) 
argues that the choice elected by the municipality in establishing 
committees has a bearing on the ability of the municipal council to hold the 
executive accountable. In instances where council committees are limited 
to generic matters of the council and excludes portfolio committees, the 
capacity of the council to oversee the executive tends to be reduced. 
Williams (2012, p.59) recommends that municipalities establish portfolio 
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committees as section 79 committees comprised of non-executive 
councillors with a mandate to oversee the various directorates or portfolios 
of the executive on behalf of the council. 
 
In their review of scholarly literature emerging from researchers who are 
studying parliamentary committees, Friedberg and Hazan (2012, p.20) 
recommend the following measures enhancing the legislative committees: 
“ 
a) The establishment of a system of mostly permanent committees in 
the legislature, which meet during every legislative term of office and 
whose responsibilities are anchored in legislation and in the rules of 
procedure. 
b) Structuring the committee system so that it corresponds as much as 
possible with the ministerial portfolios. 
c) Augmenting the professional support of the committees by 
significantly increasing committee budgets and staff.  
d) Instituting clear criteria for committee conclusions/reports in order to 
ensure that their phraseology does not facilitate disregard by the 
executive branch, and to grant the house resolutions a binding legal 
status which will obligate the executive to report the steps that they 
took and will allow the imposition of sanctions against the relevant 
ministers for non-compliance. 
e) Committees to have the ability and obligation to monitor the 
implementation of their decisions and recommendations and the 
plenary to have a follow-up debate as a closure to the chain of 
oversight. 
f) Granting the committees the authority to compel witnesses to appear 
before them and present documents. 
g) Reducing the control of the party over its members in the committee 
by limiting the ability to change/remove their representatives 
assigned to a particular committee. 
h) Selective closure of committee debates to the media to avoid any 
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competition for the attention of the media among committee 
members”.  
 
2.3.4 The Supreme Audit Institution and oversight 
 
The lead public sector organisation in a country mandated to scrutinise 
whether public funds are spent economically in a manner that is aligned to 
the regulations and national priorities are the Supreme Audit Institutions 
(SAI’s).  At their inception, they were mandated to assess whether 
government’s financial statements reflect a true picture with respect to the 
revenues collected and expenditure incurred and whether public institutions 
operation within the relevant legislation (Hegarty and Musonda, 2011: p.11). 
 
According to van Zyl, Ramkumar and de Renzio (2009, p.13) there are three 
models of Supreme Audit Institutions: the Westminster model which is 
headed by an Auditor-General and reports to the legislature, the Board or 
Collegiate model which is similar to the Westminster model except that it is 
headed by a group of members in a College or Governing Board, and the 
Judicial or Napoleonic model in which the Supreme Audit Institution is a 
court of law whose members are judges who can impose penalties.. The 
three models of SAI’s have in common the assurance of their independence 
and the consideration of the audit results by parliament as the key pre 
requisites for their existence and effectiveness.  
 
In a democracy, the elected representatives in various parliaments allocate 
taxpayers’ money to the executive arm of government in the form of passing 
a budget to realise their policy objectives and in return, the executive is 
expected to account for its stewardship of the public funds in a manner that 
is consistent with the essential principles of democratic government which 
are accountability, transparency and value for money in the use of public 
funds. The SAI’s provide an independent review and assurance to 
parliament and the public on the accounts as well as the execution of 
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government programmes and initiatives. An environment suitable for SAI’s 
to execute their mandate is where they report freely with their findings and 
recommendations receiving parliamentary attention and being acted upon 
(SIGMA, 2002: p.11). 
 
During the oversight stage within a budget cycle, all departments and public 
bodies prepare and submit their accounts for the previous year to the SAI 
in a prearranged time which audits them and produces a report to the 
legislature which refers it to the relevant committee. The committee, which 
is usually a public accounts committee in most legislatures, considers the 
reports by examining them, conducting public hearings and summoning 
public officials to give evidence. A report with findings and 
recommendations is compiled and considered by the legislature after which 
the outcome is conveyed the executive to act on (Wang and Rakner, 2005: 
p.7).  
  
SIGMA (2002, p.28) asserts that the relationship between parliament and 
the SAI is symbiotic and characterised by a dependency on each other 
where the effectiveness of parliament in its oversight function is enhanced 
when utilising the auditing outputs of an SAI whilst the consideration of the 
SAI audit results and the encouragement of others to take appropriate 
corrective action by parliament and its committees enhances the 
effectiveness of the SAI. Hedger et al (2008, p.4) and Wehner (2002, p.4) 
refer to public audit and parliamentary accountability as the two dimensions 
of accountability that are mutually reinforcing with the SAI providing support 
to parliament through the PAC. These two dimensions of accountability are 
neither the same nor subsidiary to one another.  
 
Proactive and conscious measures that will ensure that parliament has full 
confidence in the SAI are vital. According to SIGMA (2002, p.29), the SAI 
has a duty to consistently demonstrate its professionalism to parliament and 
its committees by carrying out its functions with appropriate objectivity and 
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with audit reports that generate interest from members of parliament 
because they are clear, concise, and supported by convincing evidence. 
The SAI should always be aware of the needs of parliament and its 
committees and hence take them into account when they undertake their 
audit responsibilities.  The establishment of a dedicated capacity to co-
ordinate the interface with parliament was seen as useful by some SAI’s.   
 
In South Africa, the SAI follows the Westminster model. The Auditor-
General of South Africa is established as one of the institutions supporting 
constitutional democracy according to chapter ten of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa wherein its independence is also guaranteed. The 
Public Audit Act of 2004 (PAA) and the Constitution provide for the AGSA 
to account to the National Assembly. The audit reports on all government 
departments, public entities, municipalities and public institutions are 
produced annually by the AGSA and tabled to legislatures with a direct 
interest such as Parliament, provincial legislatures or municipal councils. 
The audit reports are meant to support the various legislature committees 
that are responsible for oversight. 
 
The SAIs are faced by a variety of challenges depending on the context in 
which they exist, according to Stapenhurst et al (2012) and van Zyl et al 
(2009). Some are confronted by institutional constraints especially in 
developing countries where they sometimes fall short to fulfil their functions 
due to being under capacitated.  In addition, some SAIs have constraints in 
technical skills resulting in challenges during the audit of electronic 
transactions, gaining access to government systems and the inability to 
move into the field of value for money auditing. Furthermore, SAIs also face 
political challenges wherein they are unduly influenced politically and the 
failure of legislatures to follow up on audit reports. As a result of these 
challenges, audit reports are not released on time and tend to address 
financial compliance rather than broader issues of public financial 
management.  
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There are some recommendations for enabling the SAIs to achieve their 
desired purpose and therefore need consideration by various SAIs and 
parliaments according to Van Zyl et al (2009) and McGee (2002). In 
instances where the interface between the SAI and the legislature is poor, 
the SAI can collaborate with the legislature in the determination of the audit 
programme and priorities. In addition, the SAI can maximise on its 
partnership with the PAC such that the PAC regularly follows up on the 
implementation of the audit recommendations and arranges meetings that 
are following up on the recommendations to be open to the media and the 
public as a tactic of applying pressure for their implementation. 
Furthermore, the PAC could insist on corrective action within specific 
timelines in instances where audit outcomes are negative.  
 
Subsequent audits by the SAI reveal the extent of the implementation of 
previous audit findings. The PAC can implement various interventions in 
instances of poor implantation of audit findings. Good practices in this 
regard, according to Van Zyl et al (2009, p.18), include: “  
  
a) Regularly following up on implementation of audit findings 
without waiting for subsequent audit reports by calling a 
department back to table a progress report.  
b) Making such follow-up meetings open to the media and the 
public as this will publicise progress on the audit 
recommendations and create further pressure for 
implementation. 
c) By limiting and specifying the time that the executive has to 
implement the findings especially when an audit finding is 
particularly negative”.  
 
From the above, it can be deduced that the Auditor General is a viable 
mechanism for enhancement of accountability and an effective deterrent of 
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unaccountable behaviour. The affairs of the respective public institutions 
are made known to the public. The councillors and municipal officials tend 
to function as efficiently and effectively as possible for fear of exposure, 
public criticism and disciplinary action in cases of misuse of resources and 
poor performance as a result of the accountability that is enhanced by the 
office of the Auditor-General. 
 
2.3.5 Public Accounts Committee as an oversight mechanism 
 
According to Hedger and Blick (2008, p.4), ”the mandate for reviewing 
public expenditure and for holding government to account for that 
expenditure is located within the framework of intra-governmental 
horizontal accountability and rests with the Supreme Audit Institution and 
the Public Accounts Committee”. Wehner (2002, p.3) asserts that 
parliamentary engagement with the budget takes place in several stages 
and these include the consideration of the budget, passing of the finance 
bill, monitoring of budget execution and the consideration of whether 
budget implementation complied with the wishes of parliament. 
Furthermore, Wehner (2003, p.23) suggests that the core mandate of the 
PAC is to review the findings of the Auditor General and ensure responses 
to the matters needing attention.  
 
Pellizo and Stapenhurst (2006, p.2) assert that “the first PAC was set up 
through a resolution in the United Kingdom House of Commons in 1861 
with a mandate to support Parliament in holding the government to 
account for its use of public funds and resources”. PAC’s are now in 
existence in many Commonwealth Parliaments and are essential for public 
sector accountability and governance. The existence of public accounts 
committees is institutionalised through various means, through a country’s 
constitution, a standing order of the legislature or legislation.  
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Uncertainty about the powers of the public accounts committee would 
result in significant challenges that could undermine its mandate. 
According to CCAF (2006, p.19), a framework of power and functions of a 
PAC that are formal and clearly defined are a prerequisite for a successful 
committee. Pelizzo et al (2005), in their discussion of key success factors 
for public accounts committees, concurs and highlights the following key 
powers that would enhance their effectiveness; “ 
 
 to investigate or review all past, current and committed 
expenditures of government as it provides the committee with a 
broad mandate and enhanced potential to discourage waste and 
wrongdoing, resulting in improved management of public 
resources;  
 to choose subjects for examination without government direction 
and advice as this provides the PAC with the freedom of action to 
focus on relevant important matters beyond the audit reports;  
  to make recommendations and publish conclusions as this 
compels the executive to respond and effect redress where 
necessary”. 
 
According to May (1983) in Wehner (2003, p.25), “The [PAC] does not 
seek to concern itself with policy; its interest is in whether policy is carried 
out efficiently, effectively and economically. Its main functions are to see 
that public monies are applied for the purposes prescribed by Parliament, 
that extravagance and waste are minimised and that sound financial 
practices are encouraged in estimating and contracting, and in 
administration, generally.” Wehner (2003), Pelizzo et al (2005) and CCAF 
(2006) concur and refer to the policy neutrality of the public accounts 
committee as a unique and distinguishing feature from other committees. 
As a result administrative heads of government agencies are the 
witnesses in hearings rather than the political heads or ministers.  
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Jacobs (2012, p.12) asserts that the PAC cannot be effective when 
operating alone and therefore needs to partner with other elements of 
parliamentary oversight and audit. Hedger et al (2008, p.22) further assert 
that in addition to policy neutrality and inter-party co-operation, 
independence is the third fundamental and interlinked principle of the 
public accounts committees. Depoliticising the appointment of the PAC 
chairperson could enhance the committee independence as it will limit the 
external political influence. Some jurisdictions, according to McGee 
(2002), believe that appointing an opposition member as a PAC chair 
tends to level the playing field between governing party and opposition 
members in the committee thereby creating a non-partisan environment. 
Furthermore, a practice of making committee decisions through 
consensus is followed in many parliaments. Finally, members of the 
cabinet are not eligible to serve in the PAC as that might compromise the 
independence of the committee and the credibility of its reports.   
 
Public accounts committees in various jurisdictions encounter various 
challenges that inhibit their effectiveness as a result of the environment, 
institutional factors and the behaviour of the members. Pelizzo et al (2006) 
identifies the following three hindrances to the proper functioning of the 
public accounts committee:  
 partisanship where some members of the committee operate with 
a very partisan spirit; 
 instances where some executives consider parliamentary 
oversight as an unnecessary interference in their work;  
 and lastly, where there is tolerance for corruption and other forms 
of improper behaviour. 
 
Furthermore, Wehner (2003, p.29) adds that indifference from the 
executives, the inconsistent quality of audit reports and the increasing 
institutional complexity of government also pose challenges to PAC 
effectiveness.   
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From the above, it can be concluded that the PAC is a viable mechanism 
for enhancement of accountability through its oversight over the finances 
and also an effective deterrent of unaccountable behaviour. The PAC 
creates a platform of engagement on the findings of the Auditor-General 
followed by resolutions by the respective legislatures arising from the 
recommendations of the committee. The affairs of the various spheres of 
government, including municipalities, are made known to the public.  
 
2.3.6 Standardising PAC features  
 
Over the last two decades, a number of organisations and authors have 
extensively described and analysed key features of the PAC.  These 
include the Canadian Council of Public Accounts Committees (CCPAC), 
who were aiming at improved accountability as a result of PAC practices 
in 1991 conducted an implementation comparison of over fifty features on 
fourteen public accounts committees in Canada’s national and provincial 
legislatures (CCPAC, 1991). In addition, a report on practices of PACs in 
70 of the Commonwealth’s member countries was produced by the 
Commonwealth Parliamentary Association in 2001 in which 
recommendations and conclusions were presented on key requirements 
for PAC’s that are effective (McGee, 2002).   
 
According to Stapenhurst, Sahgal, Woodley and Pelizzo (2005), the PAC 
was more successful as per the analysis of the data collected by the WBI 
when it: 
 
 focussed on public sector financial activities rather than policies; 
 had the power to investigate present and all past public sector 
expenditure;  
 was given the power to follow up on government actions arising 
from the recommendations of the PAC; 
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 worked in partnership with the Auditor General.  
 
According to Stapenhurst et al (p.25; 2005), some aspects of an ideal PAC 
were distilled into the following seventeen characteristics from the analysis 
(see Table 2.1):  
 
 
Table 2.2: The “ideal” PAC  
 
1. “The Committee is small; committees seem to work well 
with 5-11 members, none of whom should be government 
Ministers. 
2. Senior opposition figures are associated with the PAC’s work, and 
probably chair the Committee. 
3. The Chair is a senior parliamentarian, who is fair-
minded and respected by parliament. 
4. The Committee is appointed for the full term of the parliament. 
5. The Committee is adequately resourced, with an 
experienced clerk and a competent researcher(s). 
6. There is clarity on the Committee’s role and responsibilities. 
7. The Committee meets frequently and regularly. 
8. Hearings are open to the public; a full verbatim transcript 
and summary minutes are quickly available for public 
distribution. 
9. A steering committee plans the Committee’s work in 
advance and prepares an agenda for each meeting to 
the full Committee. 
10. The typical witness is a senior public servant (the 
‘accounting officer’) accompanied by the officials who have 
a detailed understanding of the issues under examination. 
11. The Auditor’s Report is automatically referred to the 
Committee and the Auditor meets with the Committee to 
go over the highlights of the report. 
12. In addition to issues raised by the Auditor, the Committee 
occasionally decides to investigate other matters. 
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13. The Committee strives for consensus in its reports. 
14. The Committee issues formal substantive reports to parliament, at 
least annually. 
15. The Committee has an established procedure with the 
government for following up recommendations and is 
informed about what, if any, action has been taken; 
16. In all its deliberations, the Committee uses the Auditor-General as 
an expert advisor; 
17. Parliaments hold an annual debate on the work of the 
Committee”. 
 
 
Source: Stapenhurst, Sahgal, Woodley and Pelizzo (2005), p.25. 
 
A study of the working practices, structures and responsibilities followed 
by PACs across Australia and New Zealand as the basis for effective 
public sector financial accountability and governance was published in 
2006 by the Public Sector Governance and Accountability Research 
Centre at La Trobe University. Various structures and working practices 
developed by most PAC’s in Australia and New Zealand that were 
regarded as effective for any PAC were identified by the study.  
 
A survey on the PAC’s in the ten national and provincial legislatures in 
South Africa followed in 2007 (APAC, 2007). These studies indicated a 
variety of approaches in the composition and mode of operation arising 
from environmental factors in specific regions. However, these emerging 
features gave a deeper understanding into approaches that were generally 
followed in various regions of the world. Botes (2011, p.32) proposed a list 
of 20 generally accepted PAC practices out of a comparative analysis of 
the documented features and characteristics of PACs by the various 
authors and organisations which were supported by at least three out of 
five eminent authors on and which were considered to be crucial for an 
effective functioning PAC to align with (see Table 2.2). 
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Table 2.3: “Generally accepted PAC Practices” 
1. “The PAC is established by legislation or standing rules. 
2. The PAC mandate is clear (i.e. ex post examination of public sector 
finances). 
3. A written description of the PAC mandate and terms of reference 
exists. 
4. The focus of the PAC is on policy implementation and not policy 
itself. 
5. The PAC has power to compel any person to appear 
before it, or to have    access to any relevant information. 
6. The PAC has powers to initiate own investigations. 
7. The PAC may make recommendations to the Executive via the 
House. 
8. Membership is limited to non-executive members. 
9. It is preferable for the chairman to be from the opposition. 
10. The committee operates in a non-partisan manner; always 
strives for consensus. 
11. Public hearings are the norm, giving access to the general public 
and the media. 
12. Frequent or regular meetings take place. 
13. Collaboration with other oversight committees is beneficial. 
14. PAC reports are always published and made public. 
15. Primary source documents are reports of the Auditor-General. 
16. Has access to adequate resources – secretarial, research and audit. 
17. Members are exposed to specialised training/professional 
development. 
18. Debating on the PAC report takes place in the legislature (plenary). 
19. Executive authority is required to respond to PAC recommendations. 
20. Records of proceedings of the committee are kept”. 
 
Source: Botes (2011) 
 
The author categorised the 20 generally accepted PAC practices into the 
institutional design and practices of the PAC through conducting a 
comparative analysis between the generally accepted PAC practices as 
proposed by Botes (2011) and the questionnaire of potential success 
factors that was utilised by the World Bank Institute (Stapenhurst et al, 
2005: p.33) in their analysis of PACs in 51 national and state/provincial 
parliaments in Commonwealth countries (Asia, Australasia, Canada and 
the United Kingdom). This is illustrated in Table 2.3.  
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Table 2.4: Institutional design and practices of PACs 
 
Institutional Design  
1. “The PAC is established by legislation or standing rules. 
2. The PAC mandate is clear (i.e. ex post examination of public sector 
finances). 
3. A written description of the PAC mandate and terms of reference 
exists. 
4. The focus of the PAC is on policy implementation and not policy 
itself. 
5. The PAC has the power to compel any person to appear before it, 
or to be given access to any relevant information. 
6. The PAC has powers to initiate its own investigations. 
7. The PAC may make recommendations to the Executive via the 
House. 
8. Membership is limited to non-executive members. 
9. Frequent or regular meetings take place. 
10. Public hearings are the norm, giving access to the general public 
and the media. 
11. PAC reports are always published and made public. 
12. Primary source documents are reports of the Auditor-General. 
 
Practices of the PAC  
1. It is preferable for the chairman to be from the opposition party. 
2. The committee operates in a non-partisan manner and always 
strives for consensus. 
3. Collaboration with other oversight committees is beneficial. 
4. It has access to adequate resources – secretarial, research and 
audit. 
5. Members are exposed to specialised training/professional 
development. 
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6. Debating on the PAC report takes place in the legislature 
(plenary). 
7. Executive authority is required to respond to PAC 
recommendations. 
8. Records of proceedings of the committee are kept”. 
 
Source: Stapenhurst, Sahgal, Woodley and Pelizzo (2005), p.25. 
 
2.3.7 Performance measurement for PACs 
 
The analysis of the data on the effectiveness of PACs in 51 national and 
provincial legislatures in Commonwealth countries in Asia, Australasia, 
Canada and the United Kingdom according to Stapenhurst et al (2005, 
p.21) revealed that no PAC had a performance measurement mechanism 
in place to measure its performance despite it being a critical feature of 
effective oversight.  Stapenhurst et al. (2005, p.23) further argues that, “in 
part, the reluctance to assess performance is a result of the difficulty of the 
questions that must be addressed, such as who should agree to the 
measures, who should see the results, and how they will be used”. He 
therefore proposed a PAC performance assessment framework that entails 
assessing the PAC with respect to its activities, its outputs and the 
outcomes.  
 
Ngozwana (2009, p.23) asserts that a PAC should assess its performance 
at least once every year guided by its performance management framework 
that specifies the PAC’s goals, objectives, inputs, resources, activities, 
processes, outputs, performance indicators and outcomes. Ngozwana 
(2009, p.24) recommends the following performance indicators for 
consideration by the various PACs: 
 
 Number of SAI’s reports considered; 
 The time elapsed between the tabling of the SAI report and the 
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hearing;  
 Number of committees reports produced; 
 Number of hearings held per year; 
 Recommendations approved or accepted by government; 
 Recommendations implemented by government; 
 Disciplinary action taken against officials who contravene financial 
administration policies and laws, as pointed out by the PAC; and 
 Compliance with laws and regulations subsequent to the PAC 
highlighting the shortcoming. 
 
Jacobs (2012, p. 11) questions the focus on the formal and explicit 
performance measurement of PACs and instead argues for the recognition 
of the role of the PAC as a critical domain of cross-party deliberation on 
issues of sound public administration. 
 
2.3.8 MPACs in South Africa 
 
Khalo (2013, p.579) asserts that the government in South Africa utilises 
performance review reports of the Auditor-General (A-G) in exercising 
accountability and oversight on municipal financial management in terms of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, and consistently raises 
shortcomings in how they account and respond to the reports. He further 
asserts that, “the void created by an absence of an oversight mechanism in 
this sphere of government accounted for the concomitant and sporadic 
mismanagement of funds, corruption and other unethical practices”. He 
believes that the establishment of Municipal Public Accounts Committees 
(MPACs) are meant to close the gaps as well as deficiencies in the local 
government oversight and accountability mechanisms, as the MPACs will 
process the auditor-general’s reports and present reports with 
recommendations to the municipal councils. The key question therefore is 
whether the MPACs will succeed in closing these gaps as well as 
deficiencies in local government oversight and accountability.  
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In the general report on the audit outcomes of local government, the Auditor 
General (2013, p.148) noted that:  
 
 MPACs had been established, but they were not yet providing the 
level of assurance required to contribute to the credibility and 
reliability of financial and performance reports, compliance with 
legislation, and effective internal controls. 
 MPACs are newly established and the structures, processes, skills 
and experience required to perform an effective oversight function are 
not yet in place. 
 Despite efforts by the provincial public accounts committees and 
other role-players to stabilise the membership of MPACs, some still 
experience a high turnover rate due to redeployment, which affects 
their continuity and effectiveness. 
 
The Auditor-General recommended the following to strengthen the 
functioning of MPACs: 
 
 The provincial leadership and oversight structures should support the 
establishment and work of these committees. 
 MPAC hearings should be prioritised to ensure that monitoring and 
review contribute to the reporting timelines of municipalities and 
ensure that audit committees are quickly responded to. 
 For the committee to be truly effective, resolutions should not only 
deal with purely financial matters, but also with financial 
management, performance reporting and compliance with legislation. 
 The municipal administration should submit quarterly reports to the 
MPAC on the implementation of its resolutions. 
 New MPAC members should attend a thorough induction session 
where all the concepts in the audit report are explained. 
 All MPAC members should be trained continuously so that this 
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oversight structure can ensure accountability within local government 
and remain relevant. 
 Councils should commit to stabilising the committees and not 
redeploy members. 
 The speakers of provincial legislatures should include MPACs in their 
speakers’ forums to improve their ability to carry out oversight. 
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2.4 LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK ON 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
This section addresses the legislative and regulatory framework within 
which the three spheres of government operate in South Africa. The 
Constitution of South Africa and the various pieces of legislation are 
reviewed with respect to their provisions for accountability and financial 
oversight.  
 
2.4.1 The South African Constitution  
 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa has clear provisions for 
accountability and good governance due to their importance. Section 1 (d) 
of the South African Constitution provides for accountability, 
responsiveness and openness as founding values of South Africa.  In 
addition, section 41(1)(c) of the Constitution requires effective, transparent, 
accountable and coherent government for South Africa as a whole by all 
spheres of government and all organs of state within each sphere. 
Furthermore, democratic and accountable government for local 
communities is also provided for in section 152(a) of the South African 
constitution.   
 
Parliament, provincial legislatures and municipal councils are established 
by the Constitution as the legislative authorities of the national, provincial 
and municipal spheres of government respectively. In addition, national and 
provincial legislatures are obliged to maintain oversight over the exercise 
of executive authority in section 55 and 114 where they are given a 
responsibility to provide mechanisms to ensure all executive organs of state 
are accountable to them. National and provincial legislatures together with 
their respective committees have power to summon any person or organ to 
appear before it to give evidence, to report to the legislature or any of its 
committees or to produce document according to section 56 and 115 of the 
Constitution. 
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In their capacities as sources of executive power, sections 86 and 128 of 
the Constitution provide for the election of the President and the Premiers 
by the national assembly and provincial legislatures respectively. The 
national cabinet, provincial executive councils and their members are 
obliged by sections 92 and 133 of the Constitution to be accountable 
collectively and individually to their respective legislature. However, the 
constitution falls short of providing the same powers and obligations for 
local government.  
 
2.4.2 Local Government Municipal Structures Act 
 
The establishment of various categories of municipalities, the regulation of 
their internal systems, structures and office bearers of municipalities are 
provided for in the Local Government Municipal Structures Act of 1998 
(MSTA). In particular, section 33 provides for the establishment of 
committees by the municipality guided by the powers and functions of the 
municipality, the need for their delegation and the resources to support the 
committee. Section 79 provides for the establishment of committees to 
support the performance of the municipal council’s powers and functions. 
Section 80 provides for committees to support the executive committee or 
the executive mayor and are therefore accountable to the executive of the 
municipality.  
 
The MSTA instructs the municipal council to attempt, within its capacity, to 
achieve the objectives as set out in section 152 of the Constitution. In terms 
of section 19(1) of the MSTA, a municipal council must annually review its 
overall performance in achieving the objectives outlined in section 152 of 
the Constitution. This provision confirms the role of the municipal council in 
reviewing the performance of the municipalities in achieving its objectives. 
This role is a critical aspect of oversight including financial oversight. 
Accordingly, the municipal council is obligated to establish performance 
measures that will inform the behaviour of the other structures of the 
municipality in realising the municipal objectives. 
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2.4.3 Local Government Municipal Systems Act  
 
The core principles, processes and mechanisms to enable municipalities to 
address the socio economic upliftment of local communities is provided for 
in the Local Government Municipal Systems Act of 2000 (MSA). The key 
duties of a municipality are set out in section 6 and includes the municipal 
administration facilitating a culture of accountability, public service, 
preventing corruption and providing the local community with reliable 
information pertaining to the standard of municipal services they are entitled 
to receive, the persons in charge, the costs and the management of the 
municipality. Section 11(3) of the MSA articulates the monitoring of the 
effectiveness and impact of policies, services and programme as key 
functions of a municipal council but the oversight role of a municipal council 
is not set out clearly.   
 
Section 4(1)(c)(i) and (ii) of the Municipal Systems Act stipulates that the 
municipal council has the power to finance the affairs of the municipality by 
charging fees for services, imposing surcharges on fees and rates on 
property. In addition, the municipal council is required to exercise its 
legislative and executive authority to use the resources of the municipality 
in the best interests of the local community as well as in a democratic and 
accountable manner.  
 
Another profound element that illustrates the authority of the municipal 
council as referred to earlier is the concept of delegation. The Municipal 
Systems Act authorises the municipal council to delegate its functions. 
Provision is made in section 59(1) of the MSA for the municipal council to 
‘develop a system of delegation that will maximise administrative and 
operational efficiency and provide adequate checks and balances in 
accordance with that system’. The municipal council’s authority to delegate 
indicates its ability to shape and influence the behaviour and conduct of the 
delegates. This implies that the delegation arrangement effectively 
subordinates the executive and the administrative structures to the 
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municipal council. Therefore, the executive structures, namely the 
Executive Mayor or the Mayor, Executive Committees and administrative 
structures, are accountable to the municipal council for how they exercise 
the delegated powers and functions. 
 
2.4.4 Local Government Municipal Finance Act  
 
The Municipal Finance Management Act No. 56 of 2003 (MFMA) is the 
primary statute regulating the finances of the municipality. The MFMA is 
aimed at securing sound and sustainable management of the fiscal and 
financial affairs of municipalities and municipal entities by establishing 
norms and standards and other requirements. In general, the MFMA further 
gives effect to the constitutional provisions on fiscal and budgetary issues. 
It specifically regulates transparency, accountability and appropriate lines 
of responsibility in the fiscal and financial affairs of municipalities. In 
addition, the Municipal Finance Management Act governs the management 
of revenue and expenditure, as well as the budgetary and financial planning 
processes.  
 
The MFMA in section 52 and 53 provides for the general political guidance 
by the mayor over the fiscal and financial affairs of the municipality which 
include overseeing and monitoring the accounting officer and the chief 
financial officer when exercising their responsibilities assigned by the act 
without interfering in the exercise of those responsibilities. In addition, the 
mayor has to ensure that the annual budget of the municipality is approved 
in time, the approval of the service delivery and budget implementation plan 
within twenty eight days after the passing of the budget by the council and 
the signing of the performance agreements of the municipal manager and 
senior managers that are linked to the performance objectives of the budget 
and the service delivery and budget implementation plan.  
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The MFMA in sections 62, 64 and 65 provides for the municipal manager to 
be an accounting officer of the municipality who is responsible for managing 
the financial administration of the municipality and ensure that municipal 
resources are utilised effectively, efficiently and economically. Section 117 
excludes the councillors of a municipality from serving in municipal bid 
committees and attending procurement meeting even as an observer.  
 
With respect to reporting, section 121 provides for every municipality for 
each financial year to present an annual report to the council that must 
include annual financial statements, the audit report of the Auditor General 
and the annual performance report of the municipality. The council of a 
municipality must consider the annual report according to section 129 no 
later than two months from the tabling of the report in the council and 
endorse an oversight report that includes a statement on whether the annual 
report is rejected, approved with or without reservations, or referred back 
for revisions. The National Treasury may issue guidelines to support 
municipalities in dealing with the annual report especially with respect to the 
functioning and composition of any public accounts or oversight committees 
established by the council to assist them to consider an annual report. 
Section 131 obliges the mayor to ensure that matters raised by the Auditor 
General in the audit report are addressed by the municipality.  
 
2.4.5 Public Audit Act  
 
The core objective of the Public Audit Act No 25 of 2004 (PAA) is to give 
effect to the provisions of the Constitution by establishing and assigning the 
supreme audit functions to an Auditor General and also to provide for the 
auditing of institutions and accounting entities in the public sector. Section 
4 mandates the Auditor General to audit and report on the accounts, 
financial statements and financial management of all national and provincial 
state departments and municipalities. Section 14 provides for the 
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submission of financial statements by the municipalities that comply with the 
requirements of the MFMA within the period and format determined.  
 
Section 15 provides the Auditor General with powers to have unrestricted 
access all documents and electronic information which contain the financial 
information, performance and assets under the control of a municipality. In 
return, the municipalities are obliged according to section 19 to render all 
reasonable assistance to enable the Auditor General to complete the audit 
within applicable time frames and also accede to all reasonable requests of 
the Auditor General to facilitate the expeditious completion of the audit.  The 
reports of the Auditor General according to section 20 must entail opinions 
and conclusions on whether the financial statements, results of municipal 
operations and cash flow  for the period is fairly presented in all material 
aspects and as per the requirements of the MFMA. In addition, the audit 
report needs to express an opinion on the performance against 
predetermined objectives by the municipality and whether the resources of 
the municipality were procured economically and utilised effectively.  
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2.4.6 Guidelines for the establishment of Municipal Public Accounts 
Committees  
 
In August 2011 the National Treasury together with the Department of 
Cooperative Governance issued guidelines aimed at providing 
municipalities and councillors with information on the establishment and 
functioning of Municipal Public Accounts Committees (MPACs) so as to 
strengthen the oversight arrangements in municipalities. This was done in 
terms of the provisions of the Local Government Municipal Structures Act 
117 of 1998 and the Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003 for 
MPACs to serve as an oversight committee to exercise oversight over the 
executive obligations of council. The mandate of MPACs is to assist council 
to hold the executive and municipal entities to account and to ensure the 
efficient and effective use of municipal resources. The Guidelines must be 
read together with MFMA Circular 32 of 15 March 2006 and address 
institutional, functional, composition, membership, work programme, 
meeting arrangements and reporting of MPAC. 
 
The guidelines provide for the MPAC to undertake and manage similar 
functions and responsibilities for municipalities, as undertaken by the 
Standing Committee on Public Accounts in the national and provincial 
legislatures, except for certain powers regarding the subpoena of 
individuals. In addition, the MPAC is not responsible for policy formulation 
or prioritization matters and reports directly to Council through the Speaker 
of the municipality and interfaces with the other committees of council 
through the Speaker, where relevant. The similarity in the functions and 
responsibilities of MPACs for municipalities with those of the Standing 
Committee on Public Accounts in national and provincial legislatures of 
South Africa represent a step forward in bringing about clarity on the core 
mandate of MPACs. 
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The Guideline outlines the primary functions of the Municipal Public 
Accounts Committees as follows: 
 
a) To consider and evaluate the content of the annual report and 
to make recommendations to Council when adopting an 
oversight report on the annual report; 
b) In order to assist with the conclusion of matters that may not 
be finalized, information relating to past recommendations 
made on the Annual Report must also be reviewed. This 
relates to current in-year reports, including the quarterly, mid-
year and annual reports; 
c) To examine the financial statements and audit reports of the 
municipality and municipal entities, and in doing so, the 
committee must consider improvements from previous 
statements and reports and must evaluate the extent to which 
the Audit Committee’s and the Auditor General’s 
recommendations have been implemented; 
d) To promote good governance, transparency and 
accountability on the use of municipal resources;  
e) To recommend or undertake any investigation in its area of 
responsibility, after reviewing any investigation report already 
undertaken by the municipality or the Audit Committee; and 
f) To perform any other functions assigned to it through a 
resolution of council within its area of responsibility. 
 
Section 3.1 of the MPAC guidelines provides a valuable summary on the 
mandate of the MPAC as it has earlier been established that the mandate 
of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts in national and provincial 
legislatures of South Africa are aligned to the generally accepted practices 
of public accounts committees. Section 3.2(c), (d) and (f) entails the 
examination of financial statements and audit reports, promotion of 
accountability and conducting investigations where required. These 
52 
 
sections are therefore an elaboration of the ex-post examination of public 
sector finances. Sections (a) and (b) articulate the evaluation of the annual 
report and related follow-up exercises. These responsibilities entail 
examining the general performance of the municipality and are broader 
than the focus on financial statements and the auditor’s reports 
 
The guideline also provides for the MPAC to include councillors excluding 
those who are serving as Executive Mayor or Deputy Executive Mayor, 
Mayor or Deputy Mayor, Speaker, Chief Whip, a member of the Mayoral 
Committee, a member of the Executive Committee and for councillors 
serving on the MPAC to be appointed for a term which corresponds to the 
term of the sitting Council. Furthermore, in deciding on the Chairperson, the 
Council may consider appointing councillors from parties other than the 
majority parties in Council and may also consider making the position of 
Chairperson of the Committee full-time. 
 
2.4.7 Summary  
 
Unlike the municipal sphere of government, the framework for legislative 
oversight of executive authority actions has been provided for clearly in the 
Constitution of South Africa for the national and provincial spheres of 
government. The Municipal Structures Act adequately elaborates on the 
executive structures and their relationship in a municipality and is very thin 
on the oversight structures of the municipal council.  The provisions 
contained in the guidelines for the establishment of MPACs are important 
as they provide for greater clarity on the mandate and composition of 
MPACs, but they remain as guidelines for various councils to consider 
adopting. 
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2.5 CONCLUSION   
 
The theoretical and conceptual frameworks that have been discussed in 
this chapter will assist the researcher to discuss the findings that will 
emerge from the research. This means that the findings regarding how the 
institutional design and practices of the NMBM MPAC compare with those 
of generally accepted public accounts committees as well as the 
mechanisms for measuring the performance of the MPAC will be related to 
the concepts that are raised in this chapter. Theories will serve as lenses 
by which the financial oversight role of the MPAC will be explored. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
In the previous chapter it was established that any municipality that decides 
to establish an MPAC will do so within the context of the MPAC Guidelines 
that were jointly issued in 2011 by the National Treasury and the 
Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs.  
 
This chapter documents the design and methodology that were followed. 
Use of the qualitative method is motivated and the research instrument is 
discussed. It also sets out the rationale for electing to study the Nelson 
Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipal Public Accounts Committee as well as 
the research methodology and approach. The NMBM MPAC was more than 
three years in operation at the time of the study. The objective of the 
research was to establish the extent to which the NMBM MPAC adheres to 
the generally accepted mandates and practices of a public accounts 
committee and to better understand the performance measurement 
mechanism of the NMBM MPAC.   
 
3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Myers (2013, p.6) defines research as an original investigation undertaken 
in order to contribute to knowledge and understanding in a particular field. 
It is also a creative activity leading to the production of new knowledge. 
Creswell (2013, p.107) defines a research design as “a set of guidelines and 
instructions to be followed in addressing the research problem”. He further 
believes that the research design enables the researcher to anticipate the 
appropriate research decisions that are necessary so as to maximise the 
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validity of the eventual results. Lyon (2012, p.78) defines research 
methodology as a way to systematically solve the research problem. It may 
be understood as a science of studying how research is done scientifically.  
 
Leedy and Ormrod in Williams (2007, p.65) stated “Research is the process 
of collecting, analysing and interpreting data in order to understand a 
phenomenon”. Quantitative, qualitative and mixed methods are the three 
approaches to conducting research according to Williams (2007, p.65). 
Furthermore, the selection of the appropriate method depends on the nature 
of the data required to respond to the research questions with numerical, 
textural and a combination of the numerical and textural data leading to 
quantitative, qualitative and mixed methods respectively.  
 
3.3 QUALITATIVE RESEARCH  
 
Qualitative research acknowledges that meaning is socially constructed by 
individuals in interaction with their world and that there are multiple 
constructions and interpretations of reality that are in flux and change over 
time. Qualitative researchers are therefore interested in understanding 
what those interpretations are at a particular point in time and in a particular 
context (Merriam; 2002: p.3). Kothari (2006, p.4) asserts that qualitative 
research seeks systematically to describe and interpret issues and 
phenomena, and to generate new concepts and theories. Qualitative 
methods are appropriate when the research question pertains to 
understanding or describing a phenomenon about which little is known, 
when seeking to understand the inside point of view of the study 
participants and when context is integral to the question.  
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According to Yin (2011, p.7), qualitative research is characterised by the 
following features: “ 
 
a) Studying the meaning of people’s lives, under real-world conditions; 
b) Representing the views and perspectives of the participants in a 
study; 
c) Covering the contextual conditions within which people live; 
d) Contributing insights into existing or emerging concepts that may 
help to explain human social behaviour; and 
e) Striving to use multiple sources of evidence rather than relying on a 
single source alone.” 
  
A qualitative research method was deemed as suitable as it is followed in 
instances where there is a need to study a particular subject in depth, 
especially where there is a new topic to be explored and in an area where 
there is very little or no previous published research (Myers, 2013: p.7). The 
choice of the research design was also influenced by its ability to provide 
an intensive description and analysis of a phenomenon or social unit such 
as an individual, group, institution or community (Merriam, 2011: p.8). A 
qualitative approach was used to assess the extent to which the NMBM 
MPAC adheres to the generally accepted mandates and practices of a 
public accounts committee and to also understand its performance 
measurement mechanism. 
 
Myers (2013, p.36) believes that interpretive researchers assume that 
access to reality is only through social constructions such as language, 
consciousness, shared meanings and instruments; and aims to understand 
a phenomenon within its context. For the purposes of this study, the 
researcher adopted an interpretive qualitative research paradigm as the 
core focus and characteristic was the search for meaning and 
understanding of the phenomenon under study. The overarching purpose 
of the study was to understand the powers and practices of a municipal 
public accounts committee and their alignment to the generally accepted 
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public accounts practices by national and provincial legislatures 
internationally as well as performance measurement mechanisms. 
Therefore this method of research is the most suitable.   
3.4 CASE STUDY APPROACH  
 
Salkind (2012, p.217) asserts that case study is a method used to study an 
individual or an institution in a unique setting or situation in as intense and 
detailed a manner as possible. The focus on one individual or institution 
enables a very close examination and the collection of a large quantity of 
detailed data that reveal a diversity and richness of human behaviour that 
is not accessible through any other method. The appropriateness of using 
a case study was also influenced by the intention to understand the 
perceptions of members of the municipal public accounts committee in 
promoting effective financial accountability. This approach is informed by 
an understanding that the municipal council has the legal authority to 
promote financial accountability. 
 
A case study is an intensive description and analysis of a phenomenon or 
social unit such as an individual, group, institution or community that is 
bounded and seeks to describe the phenomenon in depth (Yin, 2013: p.8). 
Furthermore, a researcher may intensively investigate one case, focusing 
on several factors (Neuman, 2011: p.40). For the purpose of gaining in-
depth knowledge of a single municipal public accounts committee, a case 
study approach was selected. The phenomena of interest in this study were 
the powers, practices and performance measurement mechanisms of the 
MPAC in effecting council oversight over its executive.  
 
Kuhn (1987) in Flyvbjerg (2006, p.242) cautions that, “a discipline without 
a large number of thoroughly executed case studies is a discipline without 
systematic production of exemplars, and that a discipline without exemplars 
is an ineffective one”. The case study on the powers and practices of the 
Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality’s public accounts committee 
58 
 
is a contribution to the comprehensive body of theory and practice 
associated with municipal public accounts committees.   
 
Gerring (2004, p.342) defines the case study as, “an intensive study of a 
single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units”. 
The case study will not only provide knowledge about the practices of the 
municipal public accounts committee of NMBM, but will also improve the 
understanding on the features of MPACs in all municipalities in South 
Africa. 
 
3.5 RATIONALE FOR SELECTION OF NELSON MANDELA BAY MPAC 
AS CASE STUDY 
 
The selection of the MPAC of the NMBM was informed by, and based on, 
the following factors: 
 
 It was the first municipality to have an MPAC to be established 
in the Eastern Cape Province; and 
 The committee was easily accessible geographically.   
 
3.6 DATA SOURCES AND SELECTION OF PARTICIPANTS   
 
Merriam (2002, p.12) asserts that interviews, observations and documents 
are the three major sources of data for a qualitative study. Interviews range 
from highly structured, where specific questions and the order in which they 
are asked are determined ahead of time, to unstructured where one has 
topic areas to explore but neither the question nor the order are 
predetermined, and lastly the semi-structured interviews which contain a 
mix of more and less structured questions. Observational data represent a 
first-hand encounter with the phenomenon of interest rather than a second-
hand account obtained in an interview, and when it is utilised in conjunction 
with interviewing, the term fieldwork or field study is sometimes used. The 
third major source of data is documents which may be written, oral, visual, 
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or cultural artefacts. Public records, personal documents and physical 
material are types of documents available to the researcher for analysis. 
 
The documentary sources, and reports on interviews with key role-players 
served as the main data sources for the research. 
 
(a) The documentary sources included: 
 
1. the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa; 
2. the Municipal Structures Act; 
3. the Municipal Systems Act; 
4. the Municipal Finance Management Act; 
5. the National Treasury Guideline for the establishment of 
Municipal Public Accounts Committees; 
6. the Terms of Reference of the NMBM MPAC; 
7. minutes of the NMBM MPAC meetings; 
8. NMBM MPAC reports ; and 
9.  2011/12 Annual Report of the NMBM. 
 
(b) Reports were compiled on the semi-structured in-depth interviews and 
follow up telephonic interviews with the key role players.  
 
The participants were selected in a purposive manner, as is usually the 
case with qualitative research, by targeting the informants from whom, on 
account of their position or experience, most can be learned (Merriam, 
2002: p.12). In addition, Merriam (2002, p.12) and Neuman (2011, p.222) 
assert that understanding the meaning of a phenomenon from the 
perspective of a participant is necessary, rather than how often or how 
much a certain response is provided. In-depth interviews were therefore 
conducted with the following participants: 
  
 The previous chairperson of the NMBM MPAC; 
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 The chairperson of the NMBM MPAC; 
 Three members of the NMBM MPAC; and 
 The manager of the MPAC Secretariat (who provides support to the 
NMBM MPAC);  
 
3.7 ACCESS TO DATA  
 
The support provided by the Speaker of the NMBM Council, the co-
operation of councillors and the support staff of the NMBM MPAC made it 
relatively easy to gain access to all sources of primary data. All the 
requested documents were received including minutes of MPAC meetings, 
the councillors made themselves available for in-depth interviews and for 
follow up telephonic interviews.  
 
3.8 RESEARCH INSTRUMENT  
 
The interview guide for the semi-structured in-depth interviews was used 
as the main research instrument. The interview approach was coupled with 
the researcher initially sharing his background so as to build trust and 
encourage the interviewees to open up (Neuman, 2011: p.406).  Additional 
motivations for preferring the semi- structured in depth interviews include:  
 
 Advance scheduling of interviews with durations that are 
predetermined;  
 Open ended questions together with probing until the response is 
adequate; 
 The interviewer shows interest in responses, encourages elaboration 
and  
 Questions answered earlier can be skipped (Neuman, 2011: p.407). 
 
The three research questions dealing with the mandate, practices and the 
performance assessment of public accounts committees formed a basis for 
61 
 
the questions in the interview guide in Appendix 1.  
 
3.9 DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION  
 
Schram (2003, p. 144) understands qualitative data analysis as a 
mechanism for reducing and organising data to produce findings that 
require description and interpretation by the researcher. Two known types 
of data analysis are thematic and content analysis. Content analysis is a 
method which helps the researcher to analyse the content of the documents 
(Denscombe, 2004; p. 221), but thematic analysis look at the emerging 
themes from the data collected. While thematic analysis is described as a 
search for themes that emerge as being important to the description of the 
phenomenon, themes are defined as a pattern in the information that at 
minimum describes and organises the possible observations and at 
maximum interprets aspects of the phenomenon according to Ehrich (2005; 
p. 11) For the purpose of this study, the thematic analysis was deemed 
appropriate by the researcher.  
 
The written notes made by the researched during the in-depth interviews 
and follow up telephonic interviews with participants were typed within forty 
eight hours so as to capture all the details whilst they were still fresh in the 
mind. The review of the documents together with the interview notes 
followed wherein various theme aligned to the research questions were 
identified. The themes were then linked to the literature review.  
 
The interview notes in conjunction with the documents were then reviewed 
in order to identify themes relevant to the research questions. This was 
done mainly by word analysis, i.e. identifying words that were used 
repeatedly, or key words in the context of the research topic and by coding. 
Throughout the process, the themes, words and codes were identified 
within the 20 generally accepted international PAC institutional features and 
practices as the main reference framework and the broader conceptual 
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framework provided by the literature review. The findings arising from the 
document were compared with the findings from the interviews so as to 
assess the extent of convergence and also the validity of the findings. The 
researcher noted some alignment between the findings from the documents 
and those from interviews. The findings were further linked with the 
literature, research questions, the analysis and conclusions.  
 
3.10 ETHICAL STATEMENT 
 
Salkind (2012, p. 85) asserts that human beings serve as participants in 
research and therefore their dignity needs to be maintained at all times.  He 
further identifies protection from harm, privacy, informed consent, 
confidentiality and honesty as basic principles underlying ethical research. 
A letter was presented to the Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality 
introducing the researcher and requesting the institution to conduct the 
research. Permission in the form of signed consent forms was obtained from 
the various participants before interviews took place.  These undertakings 
ensured that the researcher operated within the university’s research code 
of conduct.  
 
3.11 CONCLUSION  
 
This chapter discussed the methodology and the related data collection 
techniques. A detailed explanation and justification for the methodology, 
case study, data collection and analyses have been outlined. 
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CHAPTER FOUR  
 
ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS  
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
The aim of this chapter is to present, analyse and discuss the findings and 
to correlate them with the conceptual framework in chapter two and the 
generally accepted features of public accounts committees. The data were 
generated through semi-structured interviews and documentary analysis. 
This chapter is structured as follows:  
 
4.1  Introduction 
4.2 Background of the NMBM MPAC 
4.3 Institutional design of the NMBM MPAC 
4.4 Practices of the NMBM MPAC 
4.5 Measurement of the performance of the NMBM MPAC 
4.6 Discussion of findings  
4.7  Conclusion  
 
The focus of the investigation was on the composition of the committee, the 
powers in relation to the investigation of municipal expenditure, its focus, 
and the relationship with the external auditor. In addition, it examines the 
conduct of the committee members, the committee’s relationship with the 
public and the media, and how it keeps its records. Furthermore, the 
mechanisms for assessing the effectiveness of the NMBM MPAC were 
reviewed.   
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4.2 BACKGROUND OF THE NMBM MPAC  
 
The Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality services approximately 
1.2 million people and was established in the year 2000. It comprises the 
city of Port Elizabeth and the towns of Uitenhage and Despatch. Port 
Elizabeth is the second oldest cities in South Africa after Cape Town.  The 
council has a budget of more than R 7 billion, one hundred and twenty 
councillors and employs approximately 10,000 staff ( NMBM Annual 
Report, 2007/08, p. 32). 
 
The legislative powers of the NMBM municipality are vested in the council 
(Section 151 of the Constitution of South Africa, 1996). In terms of this 
provision, the Municipal Council has the Constitutional Authority to pass by-
laws as well as ensure that they are implemented in accordance with the 
Councils’ intent. The results of the case study research on the various 
institutional features, practices and performance measurement 
mechanisms of the NMBM MPAC are presented below. 
 
4.3 INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN OF THE NMBM MPAC 
 
4.3.1 Establishment of Committee, mandate and terms of reference 
 
All participants stated that in 2010, the Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan 
Council passed a resolution that established its first Municipal Public 
Accounts Committee (MPAC) together with its terms of reference and 
operating guidelines.  The Council previously had an oversight committee 
whose chairperson was the Speaker and its main focus was to consider the 
annual report of the municipality and present an oversight report for 
consideration by the council. After the 2011 local government elections, a 
new MPAC was established based on the NMBM terms of reference. As a 
result of the death of the MPAC chairperson, the committee was led by an 
interim chairperson from February 2012 and was later reconstituted in April 
2013.  The minutes of the NMBM MPAC had a copy of the NMBM Council 
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resolution dated 29 October 2010 establishing the MPAC with its terms of 
reference and operational guidelines.  
 
All the participants stated that the NMBM Council did not pass another 
resolution updating the NMBM MPAC terms of reference following the 
issuing of MPAC Guidelines on 17 August 2011 by National Treasury as per 
section 129(4)(b) of the Municipal Finance Management Act of 2003. With 
respect to the mandate of the NMBM MPAC, the participants unanimously 
stated that it was the production of the oversight report as well as ensuring 
transparency and accountability in the municipality. The existence of the 
written description of the NMBM MPAC mandate and terms of reference was 
confirmed by all the interviewees and a copy of the NMBM Council resolution 
was provided to the researcher. The institutional context, mandate and 
delegated authority of the NMBM MPAC is contained in paragraphs 1.1 
and 1.8 of the NMBMM Terms of Reference and Operational Guidelines that 
were adopted by the Council. 
 
The main annual output of the NMBM MPAC according to all the participants 
is the oversight report during the February and March of every year. The 
process of producing the oversight report entails examining the annual 
report, receiving inputs on the Auditor General’s audit report that forms part 
of the annual report, receive inputs from the City Manager and the staff of 
the municipality elaborating on the various components of the annual report, 
considering inputs from stakeholders and the public and finally crafting and 
tabling the oversight report. There is no focus on the audit report from the 
Auditor General during examination of the annual report for the purpose of 
producing an oversight due to the overarching nature of the annual report 
of the NMBM. A further consideration of the audit report in the annual report 
after the tabling of the oversight report by the NMBM MPAC was viewed as 
a duplication by two of the participants.  
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4.3.2 The NMBM, MPAC and policy matters  
 
The participants stated that the NMBM MPAC does not delineate between 
policy and policy implementation in their oversight. For instance, when the 
committee reviews the annual report for the purpose of producing an 
oversight report as per section 129 of the MFMA, it would be difficult to 
delineate between policy oversight and policy implementation oversight. In 
addition, the examination of the annual report by the NMBM MPAC provides 
the only opportunity of oversight for the councillors and the public as the 
NMBM council does not have section 79 committees that are mandated to 
carry out policy oversight.  
 
Section 1.2(x) of the NMBM MPAC Terms of Reference and Operational 
Guidelines provides for the MPAC:  
 
To ensure that the policies and programmes of the Nelson Mandela 
Bay Metropolitan Municipality are implemented in an effective, 
efficient and economical manner in accordance with the principle of 
value for money (Best Business Practice) (NMBM, 2010: p.2). 
 
4.3.3 Membership of the NMBM MPAC 
 
All participants stated that members of the NMBM MPAC are non-
executive councillors. In addition, the NMBM MPAC Terms of Reference 
and Operational Guidelines in paragraph 1.4 state that the Executive Mayor, 
the Deputy Executive Mayor and other members of the Mayoral Committee 
are not eligible to serve in the NMBM MPAC. 
 
4.3.4 Access to information  
 
The participants confirmed the authority of the MPAC to have unlimited 
access to relevant information and the regular appearance of the City 
Manager when required by the MPAC. Some participants highlighted some 
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delays in accessing information from some departments dealing with 
specific matters therefore necessitating an intervention by the City 
Manager.  Furthermore, the support staff in the City Manager’s office and 
the office of the Chief Operations Officer play a supporting role in following 
up on departments who are supposed to provide information and responses 
as per the requests of the NMBM MPAC. 
 
4.3.5 MPAC work programme  
 
With respect to the powers of the NMBM MPAC to initiate its own 
investigations, 50 % of the participants were not sure whilst the other 50 % 
were certain about the NMBM MPAC having powers to initiate its own 
investigations.  
 
Paragraph 1.2 of the Terms of Reference and Operational Guidelines 
provides the following with respect to investigations by the NMBM MPAC: 
 
(xii) To recommend any investigation in its area of competence to 
Council. 
(xvii) To investigate unauthorized, irregular, fruitless and wasteful 
expenditure and submit reports and make recommendations based on 
its findings to Council. 
 
With respect to whether the NMBM MPAC makes recommendations to the 
executive through the NMBM Council, all the participants reported that 
when the NMBM MAPC has concluded its report with findings and 
recommendations, it is tabled in the Council for debate and approval, 
followed by its referral to the executive. Furthermore, paragraph 1.9 of the 
Terms of Reference and Operational Guidelines provides the following with 
respect to the reporting of the NMBM MPAC: 
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1.9.1 The Committee must discuss and adopt its report for Council in 
accordance with the procedures for tabling matters in Council as 
defined in the Rules of Order of Council. 
1.9.2 The Municipal Public Accounts Committee should report to full 
Council at least quarterly on work and challenges and may bring items 
before Council as and when necessary. 
1.9.3 Council must evaluate the performance of the Municipal Public 
Accounts Committee on an annual basis. 
 
With respect to whether all NMBM MPAC reports are published and made 
public, all participants confirmed that all Oversight Reports that are 
produced by the NMBM MPAC are published as per the provisions of 
section 129(3) of the Municipal Finance Management Act of 2008. 
However, the NMBM MPAC Terms of Reference and Operational 
Guidelines are silent on always publishing and making public all the MPAC 
reports. 
 
4.3.6 Committee meetings   
 
With respect to the NMBM MPAC having regular meetings where public 
hearings are the norm, giving access to the general public and the media, 
100 % of the participants reported that regular meetings are held where 
some committee meetings are closed to the general public and the media. 
50 % of the participants do not support the current practice of closing some 
of the meetings to the general public and the media as this contradicts with 
the principle of transparency in the financial affairs of the municipality; the 
other 50 % of participants support the practice of closing some meetings to 
the general public and the media as it makes the municipal officials to 
respond fully to committee questions without being defensive. The NMBM 
MPAC terms of reference and operational guidelines are silent the NMBM 
MPAC having regular meetings where public hearings are the norm, giving 
access to the general public and the media, 
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4.4 PRACTICES OF THE NMBMM MPAC 
 
4.4.1 NMBM MPAC leadership and committee co-operation   
 
The participants stated that the first chairperson of the NMBM MPAC was 
a member of one of the opposition parties, the Pan African Congress. A 
majority party chairperson was appointed at the start of the 2011 term of 
local government who subsequently died in 2012 and was replaced by an 
interim chairperson from the majority party in 2012. The current 
chairperson of the NMBM MPAC was appointed on 25th April 2013 and is a 
member of the majority party. The majority party candidate for the 
chairpersonship of the NMBM MPAC contested with two other minority 
party candidates and won the majority of the votes in the Council.  
Furthermore, it became clear during the interviews that minority party 
members believe that the NMBM MPAC would be more effective if the 
chairperson is not a member of the majority party as majority party 
chairpersons are easily intimidated by the executive. Other participants 
believed that having a majority party chairperson would improve the 
implementation rate of MPAC resolutions by the executive.  
 
The NMBM MPAC operates in a highly partisan environment and as a 
result, various measures were put in place to achieve a non-partisan 
approach to business. During the interviews, it emerged that some MPAC 
meetings were preceded by multi-party caucuses and bilateral 
engagements between the majority party and minority parties. These efforts 
in inter party co-operation and bi-partisan approach have resulted in very 
few instances where decisions are made by means of a vote. According to 
one participant, “the recent vote for the chairperson of the MPAC in the 
NMBM Council demonstrates that non-partisanship as an accepted 
practice in the MPAC business is still fragile and not yet entrenched in the 
NMBM Council in general and the committee in particular”.  
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With respect to the MPAC operating in a non-partisan manner and always 
striving for consensus, the NMBM terms of reference and operational 
guidelines are silent, Paragraph 1.5 of the Terms of Reference and 
Operational Guidelines provides the following for the chairperson of the 
NMBM MPAC: 
 
1.5.1 The Chairperson of the Committee must be appointed by 
Council Resolution. 
1.5.2 During the appointment of the Chairperson of the Committee 
by Council, Council must take into consideration the requirements 
of transparency, ethics and general good governance prescripts 
as well as local government legislation. 
 
4.4.2 Committee resources  
 
According to the participants, the NMBM MPAC is currently being supported 
by the secretariat which is made up of two staff members who are 
responsible for preparing the agenda, issuing the meeting packs and 
drafting the minutes of the meeting. In addition, the personal assistants in 
the offices of the City Manager and the Chief Operations Officer follow up 
with all directorates to comply with submitting reports to the NMBM MPAC. 
Furthermore, the Administration Officer in the office of the Chief Operations 
Officer prepares the Annual Oversight Report using minutes produced by 
the secretariat. The NMBM MPAC currently does not receive support from 
dedicated staff members as required by the provisions of the NMBM MPAC 
Terms of Reference and Operational Guidelines. The NMBM MPAC 
chairperson is a full-time councillor whilst the rest of the members are part-
time and also serve in other council committees. 
 
Paragraph 1.3 of the Terms of Reference and Operational Guidelines 
provides the following with respect to the resources in support of the NMBM 
MPAC: 
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In order for the Municipal Public Accounts Committee to be effective 
in executing its functions, Council must ensure that the Municipal 
Public Accounts Committee is supported by sufficient resources and 
dedicated staff members listed below: 
 
 Committee Co-ordinator / Researcher 
 Committee Services 
 Internal Audit 
 Legal Division. 
 
4.4.3 Council debates on NMBM MPAC reports 
 
All participants confirmed that the adoption of the NMBM MPAC reports by 
the NMBM Council are preceded by debate in the NMBM Council and the 
extent of the debate is influenced by the issues raised in the report.  
 
Paragraph 1.9 of the Terms of Reference and Operational Guidelines 
provides the following with respect to reporting for the NMBM MPAC: 
 
a) The Committee must discuss and adopt its report for Council in 
accordance with the procedures for tabling matters in Council as 
defined in the Rules of Order of Council. 
b) The Municipal Public Accounts Committee should report to full 
Council at least quarterly on work and challenges and may bring 
items before Council as and when necessary. 
c) Council must evaluate the performance of the Municipal Public 
Accounts Committee on an annual basis. 
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4.4.4 Follow-up actions  
 
All the participants confirmed that the minutes of the NMBM MPAC serve 
as the main record of the proceedings.  In addition, the NMBM MPAC keeps 
on its agenda all the issues that need to be resolved that arise from its 
reports as a mechanism of monitoring the implementation of the 
corresponding Council resolutions. The NMBM 2011/12 Oversight Report 
(2013, p.1) reflects as follows:  
 
The committee also wishes to record its concern at the number of 
items that appeared from last year on its agenda and throughout the 
year under review, without the relevant issues having been resolved.  
 
Paragraph 1.10 of the Terms of Reference and Operational Guidelines 
provides the following with respect to monitoring by the NMBM MPAC: 
 
a) The Committee shall develop a monitoring mechanism in line with 
the approved work programme to determine if actions have been 
taken to implement its recommendations. 
b) The responses to reports are to be provided to the Municipal Public 
Accounts Committee within 14 days after the date of the resolution 
of the Committee together with the recommendations to which they 
relate. 
 
Beyond keeping the outstanding issues on the agenda, there appears to be 
no monitoring mechanisms that have been developed by the NMBM MPAC. 
There is also no clear requirement for the executive to report to the Council 
on the resolutions arising from the MPAC reports that have been adopted. 
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4.4.5 Collaboration with other oversight committees 
 
All the participants confirmed that the NMBM Council does not have other 
oversight or non-executive committees. The NMBM Terms of Reference 
and Operational Guidelines are silent on the collaboration of the MPAC 
with other oversight committees.  
 
4.4.6 Capacity building  
 
All participants confirmed that two capacity building workshops for the 
NMBM MPAC have been facilitated thus far by the Eastern Cape 
Department of Local Government & Traditional Affairs and the.in 2011 and 
the Association of Public Accounts Committees of South Africa in 2012. 
However, there is no annual capacity building programme for NMBM 
MPAC members and officials as the recent training according to the 
participants was viewed as a once off intervention.  
 
Paragraph 1.9 (xv) of the Terms of Reference and Operational Guidelines 
provides the following with respect to capacity building for the NMBM MPAC: 
 
 To facilitate capacity building programmes for Committee Members 
and Officials to enable them to perform their duties. 
 
4.5 MEASUREMENT OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE NMBM MPAC 
 
All participants confirmed that the NMBM MPAC does not have a formal 
mechanism for measuring its performance. In addition, the evaluation of the 
performance of the MPAC by the Council as provided for by the NMBM 
MPAC Terms of Reference and Operational Guidelines has not yet been 
operationalised and no external assistance has been requested for 
assessing the MPAC performance.  
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4.6 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS  
 
The findings emerging from the data are discussed in this section and are 
related to the literature that was reviewed in Chapter 2.  The researcher 
divided this section into the following themes: institutional design, practices 
and performance measurement.  
 
4.6.1 Institutional design  
 
a) Establishment, mandate and terms of reference  
 
Regarding the establishment of the NMBM MPAC, it emerged from the data 
that the MPAC was established by means of a council resolution in 2010 
with terms of reference and operational guidelines. The NMBM MPAC terms 
of reference did not take into account the MPAC guidelines that were issued 
by the National Treasury in 2011 as per section 129(4)(b) of the Municipal 
Finance Management Act of 2003. 
 
The generally accepted public accounts committee practices (Botes, 2011) 
require the PAC to be established by means of legislation or standing rules. 
The NMBM MPAC was established by means of the standing rules of the 
NMBM Council is therefore aligned with the generally accepted institutional 
features of public accounts committees.  This is consistent with the 
assertion that public accounts committees can be institutionalised by 
various means which are a country’s constitution, a standing order of the 
assembly and legislation (Pelizzo and Stapenhurst, 2006: p.4).  
 
Regarding the MPAC mandate and the terms of reference, it emerged from 
the data that a written description of the NMBM MPAC mandate and terms 
of reference exists. The generally accepted PAC practices require a written 
description of the PAC mandate and terms of reference to exist (Botes, 
2011). In addition, CCAF (2006, p.19) and Khalo (2013, p.593) assert that 
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a formal and clearly defined framework of powers and practices of a public 
accounts committee is key to a successful committee.  The institutional 
context, mandate and delegated authority of the NMBM MPAC is 
contained in paragraphs 1.1 and 1.8 of the NMBMM Terms of Reference 
and Operational Guidelines that were adopted by the Council. It can be 
deduced that the NMBM MPAC mandate and terms of reference are 
aligned to the generally accepted PAC practices.  
 
Regarding the mandate of the NMBM MPAC, it emerged from the data as 
the production of the annual oversight report as well as ensuring 
transparency and accountability in the municipality. In addition, the primary 
source document for the NMBM MPAC is the annual report. It also emerged 
that the MPAC scrutinises the entire annual report rather than focussing on 
the municipal finances or the report of the Auditor General.  Some 
participants asserted that a further consideration of the audit report in the 
annual report after the tabling of the oversight report by the NMBM MPAC 
was viewed as a duplication. The NMBM MPAC Terms of Reference and 
Operating Guidelines are too broad and hence do not succinctly articulate 
the core mandate of the NMBM MPAC. 
 
The generally accepted PAC practices according to Botes (p.32, 2011) 
require “the PAC mandate to be clear (i.e. ex-post examination of public 
sector finances) and the reports of the Auditor General to be the primary 
source documents.  According to Khalo (2013, p.588), CCAF (2004, p.2), 
Wehner (2003, p.24) and CCAF (2006, p.8) the mandate of the public 
accounts committee is to provide an ex-post examination of public sector 
finances by reviewing the Auditor-General’s reports and identifying the 
appropriate steps to address any shortcomings. It can be deduced that the 
mandate of the NMBM MPAC is not clear and the annual report is the 
primary source document of the NMBM MPAC instead of the reports of the 
Auditor General.  
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b) The NMBM MPAC and policy matters 
 
Regarding the policy matters of the municipality and the NMBM MPAC, it emerged 
from the data that the focus of the NMBM MPAC is on all policy aspects of the 
municipality instead of policy implementation in their oversight. The NMBM 
MPAC terms of reference and operating guidelines only provide for the 
MPAC to ensure that the policies and programmes of the Nelson Mandela 
Bay Metropolitan Municipality are implemented in an effective, efficient and 
economical manner in accordance with the principle of value for money.This 
may be related to the mandate of the NMBM MPAC that is not clear and the 
utilisation of the annual report of the municipality as the source documents 
instead of the reports of the Auditor General.  
 
The generally accepted public accounts committee practices require the 
PAC to focus on policy implementation and not policy itself (Botes, 2011). 
There is broad agreement among the various authors about the stance of 
the public accounts committee towards government policy. Stapenhurst, 
Sahgal, Woodley and Pelizzo (2005, p.24) assert that PACs should focus 
on governments’ financial activity and accountability rather than evaluating 
or assessing the content of the governments’ policies. Blick and Hedger 
(2008, p.22) also point out that one of the key principles is for the PAC to 
focus on the way in which resources have been disposed of in pursuance of 
policy rather than focus on the merits of a particular policy. It can be deduced 
from the above that with respect to policy matters, the NMBM MPAC is not 
aligned to the generally accepted features of public accounts committees.  
 
c) Membership of the NMBM MPAC 
 
Regarding the membership of the NMBM MPAC, it emerged from the data 
that membership is limited to non-executive councillors. The generally 
accepted public accounts committee practices require the membership of 
the PAC to be limited to non-executive members (Botes, 2011). 
Stapenhurst et al (2012, p.6) further asserts that the freedom of the 
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committee to exercise its mandate is achieved when there is no interference 
from cabinet members and therefore cabinet members have to be excluded 
from the committee. Pelizzo et al (2006, p.11) believes that the cabinet 
members need to be excluded from the committee for the following reasons:   
 
 They might slow down or mislead the committee in order to protect 
the cabinet; 
 Governing party members would feel under pressure to act in a 
partisan manner, thus weakening the committee; 
 Having cabinet members serving in the committee would affect the 
credibility of the PAC and its deliberations.  
 It can be deduced that the membership of the NMBM MPAC is aligned to 
that of the generally accepted features of public accounts committees.  
 
d) Access to information  
 
Regarding access to information by the NMBM MPAC, it emerged from the data 
that the NMBM MPAC has adequate authority to access any relevant 
information from the municipality and for any person to appear before the 
MPAC. The generally accepted public accounts committee practices 
require the membership of the PAC to have the power to compel any 
person to appear before it or to be given access to any relevant information 
(Botes, 2011). Khalo (2013, p.592) asserts that the public accounts 
committee must have the power to call whichever witness it deems 
necessary and as required. CCAF (2006, p.27) concurs and adds that an 
effective committee needs access to credible, factual and non-partisan 
information as it is vital for holding the government to account.  
 
It can be deduced that the NMBM MPAC is aligned to the features of 
generally accepted public accounts committees with respect to access to 
information and compelling anyone to appear before the committee.  
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e) MPAC work programme  
 
Regarding investigations, it emerged from the data that the NMBM MPAC 
does not have the power to initiate its own investigations as that power 
resides with the NMBM Council. The generally accepted public accounts 
committee practices require the PAC to have the power to initiate its own 
investigations (Botes, 2011). Stapenhurst et al (2012, p.7) asserts that the 
power of the PAC to investigate all past, present and committed 
government expenditure is one of the five formal powers that emerge as 
most important. In addition, the power of the PAC to conduct investigations 
should not be limited to issues referred by the legislature or included in 
legislative audit reports (CCAF, 2006: p.21). Furthermore, Pelizzo et al 
(2006, p.13) asserts that the power of the PAC to choose the topics for 
investigation should be exercised freely without having to accept orders or 
suggestions from the executive.  
 
From the above discussion, it can be deduced that the NMBM MPAC does 
not have the power to initiate its own investigations but can only 
recommend to the Council and therefore it is not aligned to the generally 
accepted public accounts committee practices on investigations.   
 
Regarding the MPAC recommendations to the executive, it emerged from 
the data that when the NMBM MPAC has concluded its report with findings 
and recommendations, it is tabled in the Council for debate and approval, 
followed by its referral to the executive. The generally accepted public 
accounts committee practices require the PAC to make recommendations 
to the executive via the House (Botes, 2011, p.32). Ngozwana (2009, p.28) 
asserts that final public accounts committee reports should be tabled in 
parliament for debate and approval before being presented to the executive. 
The executive will then be required to respond to the recommendations, with 
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the committee following up on the implementation of the recommendations. 
It can be deduced that the NMBM MPAC is aligned to the generally 
accepted public accounts committee practices with respect to making 
recommendations to the executive via the House.  
 
Regarding the public access to the MPAC reports, it emerged from the data 
that all Oversight Reports that are produced by the NMBM MPAC are 
published as per the provisions of section 129(3) of the Municipal Finance 
Management Act of 2008. However, the NMBM MPAC Terms of Reference 
and Operational Guidelines are silent on always publishing and making 
public all the MPAC reports. The generally accepted public accounts 
committee practices require the PAC reports to always be made public and 
be published (Botes, 2011, p.32). With respect to public access to PAC 
documents, Khalo (2013, p.592), Ngozwana (2009, p.27) and Wehner 
(2002, p.14) recommend that the minutes of the PAC hearings as well as 
the reports should be kept in official records, be made available to the public 
and be published. It can be deduced that the publishing and making public 
of reports by the NMBM MPAC is aligned to the generally accepted 
practices of public accounts committees, but is not codified in the NMBM 
MPAC Terms of Reference and Operational Guidelines.   
 
f) Committee meetings  
 
Regarding the committee meetings, it emerged from the data that regular 
meetings of the NMBM MPAC are held where some are closed to the public 
when discussing sensitive matters. The Terms of Reference and 
Operational Guidelines of the NMBM MPAC are, however, silent on public 
hearings that give access to the public and the media being the norm for 
committee meetings. The generally accepted public accounts committee 
practices require the PAC to hold regular meetings in a format of public 
hearings that are accessible to the public and the media (Botes, 2011, 
p.32).  Hearings are the principle mechanism by which officials from 
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departments, agencies or other relevant bodies answer to the PAC with 
preparation by committee members and witnesses being crucial for quality 
hearings (Wehner, 2002, p.13). Several writers (Stapenhurst et al., 2005; 
Pelizzo et al., 2006; Wehner, 2003; McGee, 2002; Blick and Hedger, 
2008) recommend that opening up of PAC hearings to the public and the 
media improves their effectiveness and any exceptions to this rule need to 
be thoroughly justified and limited to exceptional circumstances. 
 
 It can be deduced from the above discussion that the NMBM MPAC is 
aligned to the generally accepted public accounts committee practices with 
respect to holding regular meetings. However, with respect to holding 
committee meetings in a public hearings format where the meetings are 
open to the public and the media, the NMBM MPAC is not aligned to the 
generally accepted practices of public accounts committees.   
 
4.6.2 MPAC practices  
 
a) Leadership and committee co-operation  
 
Regarding the leadership of the NMBM MPAC, it emerged from the data 
that the first MPAC chairperson who was appointed in 2010 was a member 
of the opposition party but as from the start of the 2011 term of local 
government, chairpersons were appointed from the majority party. Some 
members believe that the NMBM MPAC would be more effective if the 
chairperson is not a member of the majority party as majority party 
chairpersons are easily intimidated by the executive. Other believed that 
having a majority party chairperson would improve the implementation 
rate of MPAC resolutions by the executive. The terms of reference of the 
NMBM MPAC are silent on whether the chairperson should be a member 
of the majority party or one of the minority parties. The generally accepted 
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public accounts committee practices prefer the chairperson to be from the 
opposition party and for the committee to operate in a non-partisan manner 
and always strives for consensus (Botes, 2011, p.32).   
 
Two thirds of the PACs that were studied by McGee (2002, p. 66) had 
chairpersons who were members of the opposition. The practice of having 
opposition members as chairpersons of PACs arises as a result of:  
 
 The underlying non-partisan tradition that underpins the work of the 
PAC (Blick and Hedger, 2008: p.22; Wehner, 2002: p.16; Stapenhurst 
et al, 2012: p.6). 
 The willingness of the government to promote transparency through 
independent scrutiny (Blick and Hedger, 2008: p. 22; Pelizzo et al, 
2006: p.6; Khalo, 2013: p.588); and  
 To re-equilibrate the balance of power between the government and 
the opposition (Stapenhurst et al, 2012: p.6), (Pelizzo et al, 2006:p.6).  
 
From the discussions above, it can be deduced that the NMBM MPAC is 
not fully aligned to the generally accepted practices of public accounts 
committees as it once had an opposition member as a chairperson but 
presently has a majority party member as the MPAC chairperson. 
 
Stapenhurst et al (2012, p.25) asserts that, “PAC members must act in a 
non-partisan fashion and should try to have a good working relationship with 
other committee members in spite of possible partisan differences”. Wehner 
(2003, p.26) concurs and further asserts that the mandate of being neutral 
to government policy by the PAC tends to facilitate its non-partisan 
operation, and this is demonstrated by the regular tendency to operate on a 
basis of consensus and to strive towards unanimous conclusions.  Blick et 
al (2008, p.22) argues that the non-partisan tradition of the PAC is prevalent 
in many countries and is a formal requirement in some countries.  Blick et 
al (2008, p.22) and Wehner (2002, p.11) posit that unanimous reports are 
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more likely to be taken seriously by the government and other actors within 
the accountability environment such as the media. 
 
From the above discussions, it can be deduced that the non-partisan mode 
of operation and unanimity in decision-making by the NMBM MPAC is still 
emerging and not entrenched in the NMBM Council; therefore the NMBM 
MPAC is not aligned to the generally accepted practices of public accounts 
committees. 
 
b) Committee resources 
 
Regarding resources supporting the NMBM MPAC, it emerged from the data 
that the MPAC has inadequate access to support resources as it is currently 
being supported by the secretariat which is made up of two staff members 
and no research and audit support capacity. The generally accepted public 
accounts committee practices require the PAC to have access to adequate 
resources i.e. secretarial, research and audit (Botes, 2011).   
 
The lack of staff and facilities is one of the greatest constraints on PAC 
effectiveness in many developing countries (Blick et al, 2008: p.17). CCAF 
(2006, p.26) asserts that information and good advice are key requirements 
for the PAC to select the right issues and to be able to follow them through 
to an appropriate conclusion. In addition to the committee clerk, PACs 
require research staff who are highly knowledgeable in public administration 
and accountability (CCAF, 2006: p.26). Furthermore, a PAC must have a 
budget that is adequate to cover its personnel and other operational costs 
(Ngozwana, 2009: p. 27). From the above discussions, it can be deduced 
that the NMBM MPAC does not have access to adequate independent 
capacity and support and is thus not aligned to the requirements of the 
generally accepted public accounts committees. 
 
 
83 
 
c) Council debates on NMBM MPAC reports  
 
Regarding debates on the MPAC reports, it emerged from the data that the 
adoption of the NMBM MPAC reports by the NMBM Council are preceded 
by debate in the NMBM Council and the extent of the debate is influenced 
by the issues raised in the report. The generally accepted public accounts 
committee practices require the PAC report to be debated in the legislature 
plenary (Botes, 2011). CCAF (2006, p.22) asserts that the debate on the 
PAC report following its presentation to a legislature provides added value 
to the recommendations and to the whole work of the committee. Ngozwana 
(2009, p.28) and Khalo (2013, p.592) further assert that following the debate 
on the PAC report, the reports should then be approved by Parliament 
during the plenary sessions, thereby giving it the endorsement of the whole 
House. 
 
From the above discussions, it can be deduced that the NMBM MPAC 
practice of presenting their reports to the NMBM Council for debate and 
approval is aligned to the generally accepted practices of public accounts 
committees.  
 
d) Follow up actions  
 
Regarding follow up actions of the NMBM MPAC, it emerged from the data 
that the minutes serve as the main record of proceedings and the NMBM 
MPAC keeps on its agenda all the issues that need to be resolved that arise 
from its reports as a mechanism of monitoring the implementation of the 
corresponding Council resolutions. Beyond keeping the outstanding issues 
on the agenda, there appears to be no monitoring mechanisms that have 
been developed by the NMBM MPAC. There is also no clear requirement 
for the executive to report to the Council on the resolutions arising from the 
MPAC reports that have been adopted. The generally accepted public 
accounts committee practices require the records of PAC proceedings to 
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be kept and for the executive authority to respond to PAC 
recommendations (Botes, 2011).  
 
Stapenhurst et al (2005, p.25) asserts that PACs should keep the transcripts 
of their meetings and also publish their conclusions and recommendations. 
Wehner (2003, p.29) adds that the ultimate value of the PAC arises when 
the executive addresses the issues raised in the PAC reports through 
implementing committee recommendations. The CCAF (2006, p.22) argues 
that having follow-up meetings with witnesses and establishing a systematic 
follow-up process and procedures is a crucial final step for closing the 
accountability loop. It can be deduced from the above discussions that with 
respect to keeping the records of the PAC proceedings and requiring the 
executive to respond to PAC recommendations, the NMBM MPAC is not 
aligned to the generally accepted practices of public accounts committees.  
 
e) Collaboration with other oversight committees  
 
Regarding the collaboration of the NMBM MPAC with other oversight 
committees, it emerged from the data that the NMBM Council does not 
have other oversight or non-executive committees.  The generally 
accepted public accounts committee practice views the collaboration of 
the PAC with other oversight committees as beneficial (Botes, 2011). 
Wehner (2002, p.17) asserts that for the purpose of improving integration 
in oversight, including the subject expertise and also dealing with the 
increased volume of audit outputs, other parliamentary committees can 
also be involved in the consideration of relevant audit reports, if this is done 
in a way that does not lead to a politicisation of the audit process. With 
respect to the collaboration between the PAC and other oversight 
committees, the NMBM MPAC is not aligned to the generally accepted 
practices of public accounts committees. 
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f) Capacity building  
 
Regarding capacity building, it emerged from the data that two capacity 
building workshops for the NMBM MPAC have been facilitated thus far by 
the Eastern Cape Department of Local Government & Traditional Affairs and 
the.in 2011 and the Association of Public Accounts Committees of South 
Africa in 2012. However, there is no annual capacity building programme 
for NMBM MPAC members and officials as the recent training can be viewed 
as a once off intervention by outside agencies. The generally accepted 
public accounts committee practices require members to be exposed to 
specialised training and professional development (Botes, 2011).  
 
CCAF (2004, p.8) holds that legislators may need orientation to understand 
the complex procedures of government as well as in navigating the corridors 
of power when first elected, as oversight is not the key reason for voters to 
elect them. CCAF (2006, p.24) asserts that the unique parliamentary 
oversight role of the public accounts committee requires membership with 
expertise and experience. 
 
From the above discussions it can be deduced that the NMBM MPAC 
exposes its members to some once off capacity building workshops which 
are not necessarily specialised training and professional development; 
therefore the NMBM MPAC is partially aligned to the generally accepted 
practices of public accounts committee.   
 
4.6.3 NMBM MPAC performance measurement   
 
Regarding the measurement of the performance of the NMBM MPAC, it 
emerged from the data that from inception, the NMBM MPAC has not yet 
engaged in a mechanism for measuring its performance. In addition, the 
NMBM MPAC terms of reference and operational guideline provide for the 
Council to evaluate the MPAC performance on an annual basis. 
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Furthermore, the NMBM MPAC does not have a formal mechanism for 
measuring its performance.  
 
In his analysis of the data collected in 2002 from 51 national and state/ 
provincial parliaments in Commonwealth countries by the World Bank 
Institute, Stapenhurst et al (2005, p.21) establishes that no PAC had a 
mechanism in place to measure its performance and argues that this is 
surprising, given that performance reporting is a critical feature of effective 
oversight. Stapenhurst et al. (2005, p.23) further argues that, “in part, the 
reluctance to assess performance is a result of the difficulty of the questions 
that must be addressed, such as who should agree to the measures, who 
should see the results, and how they will be used. He therefore proposed 
that a framework for assessing PAC performance would entail assessing 
the PAC with respect to its activities, its outputs and the outcomes.  
 
Ngozwana (2009, p.23) concurs with Stapenhurst (2005) and asserts that a 
PAC should asses its performance at least once every year guided by its 
performance management framework that specifies the PAC’s goals, 
objectives, inputs, resources, activities, processes, outputs, performance 
indicators and outcomes. Ngozwana (2009, p.24) recommends the 
following performance indicators for consideration by the various PACs: 
 
 Number of SAIs reports considered; 
 The time elapsed between the tabling of the SAI report and the 
hearing;  
 Number of committees reports produced; 
 Number of hearings held per year; 
 Recommendations approved or accepted by government; 
 Recommendations implemented by government; 
 Disciplinary action taken against officials who contravene financial 
administration policies and laws as pointed out by the PAC; and 
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 Compliance with laws and regulations subsequent to the PAC 
highlighting the shortcoming. 
 
However, Jacobs (2012, p.11) questions the focus on the formal and explicit 
performance measurement of PACs and argues for the recognition of the 
role of the PAC as a critical domain of cross-party deliberation on issues of 
sound public administration. 
 
From the above discussions, it can be deduced that the NMBM MPAC has 
no mechanism in place to measure its performance and has never obtained 
external assistance in reviewing their success in informing the NMBM 
Council about the accountability of the Municipality. The state of affairs in 
the NMBM MPAC is consistent with the findings of Stapenhurst (2005, p.22) 
where very few committees published reports dealing with their own 
performance, or assessed their success in informing their legislatures about 
the accountability of the government. 
 
4.7 CONCLUSION  
 
With respect to the institutional design, the establishment of the NMBM 
MPAC was not informed by the guidelines that were issued by the National 
Treasury; the terms of reference were too broad and include aspects that 
go beyond the mandate of generally accepted public accounts committees; 
and the committee did not have a mandate to initiate its own investigations.  
 
With respect to the practices of the NMBM MPAC, there was no clear 
requirement for the executive to report to the Council on the resolutions 
arising from the MPAC reports that have been adopted. In addition, the 
NMBM MPAC does not have access to adequate independent capacity and 
support and hence is not aligned to the requirements of the generally 
accepted public accounts committees. Furthermore, the NMBM MPAC has 
no mechanisms for measuring its performance. The NMBM should thus 
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take steps to rectify the limitations in its institutional design and practices.  
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CHAPTER FIVE  
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
The financial management deficiencies in local government, especially with 
regard to lack of accountability, unauthorised expenditure, under-spending, 
regular negative audit outcomes and recent instances of civil unrest in a 
number of municipalities, have necessitated the need to enhance financial 
oversight over the execution of the budget.  
 
This study assessed progress in the establishment and operationalisation 
of a financial oversight mechanism called the municipal public accounts 
committee by the Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality. This was 
accomplished by assessing the alignment between the NMBM MPAC and 
generally accepted public accounts committees with respect to 
institutionalisation and practices. In addition, the performance evaluation 
mechanisms of the NMBM MPAC were also assessed.   
 
The aim of this chapter is to present a summary of the findings and 
recommendations to the NMBM and policy makers on measures to close 
the gaps identified on the basis of the lessons learnt during the case study 
and the theoretical framework derived from the literature study.  
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5.2 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
5.2.1 Establishment of NMBM MPAC  
 
In October 2010, the Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Council passed a 
resolution that established its first ever Municipal Public Accounts 
Committee (MPAC) together with its terms of reference and operating 
guidelines. Therefore, the NMB MPAC was established by means of the 
standing rules of the NBM Council and therefore aligned to the generally 
accepted PAC’s across the world. However, the NMBM MPAC terms of 
reference and operating guidelines were not informed by the MPAC 
establishment guidelines that were jointly issued by National Treasury 
and the Department of Cooperative Governance in August 2011. These 
guidelines were issued in terms of section 129(4) of the MFMA which 
provides for the issuance of guidance on the manner in which councils 
should consider the functioning and composition of public accounts 
committees that will assist council to consider the annual reports. 
 
The following recommendation is therefore made: 
 
 The Nelson Mandela Bay Municipal Council should revise the 
MPAC Terms of Reference and Operating Guidelines that were 
approved in October 2010 and take into account the MPAC 
establishment guidelines that were jointly issued by National 
Treasury and the Department of Cooperative Governance on 17 
August 2011.  
 
5.2.2 Mandate of the MPAC 
 
The NMBM MPAC Terms of Reference and Operating Guidelines are too 
broad and hence do not succinctly articulate the core mandate of the 
NMBM MPAC. This lack of focus on the mandate of the NMBM MPAC is 
demonstrated by the responsibility of examining the municipality’s annual 
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report for the purpose of producing an oversight report and also to 
scrutinise the report of the Auditor General on the municipality as well as 
investigating instances of unauthorised, irregular, wasteful and fruitless 
expenditure.  In practice, the NMBM MPAC tends to focus on the 
production of the MFMA section 129 oversight report and neglect the 
mandate of reviewing the report of the Auditor General and financial 
statements. It is clear that the NMBM MPAC focusses on a responsibility 
that is not at the core of its mandate and hence needs to fundamentally 
shift its focus to its core mandate.  
 
The MFMA does not prescribe the establishment of a single committee with 
a dual role of being an oversight committee and a public accounts 
committee. Furthermore, the guidelines for the establishment of MPACs 
(p.5, 2011) assert that, “MPAC will undertake and manage similar functions 
and responsibilities for municipalities, as undertaken by the Standing 
Committee on Public Accounts in the national and provincial legislature”.  
Assigning the responsibility of producing of an oversight committee to 
a different committee will afford the NMBM MPAC an opportunity to 
focus on reviewing the financial statements and the audit report from 
the Auditor General.  
 
The following recommendations are made in this regard:  
 
a) The core mandate of the NMBM MPAC should be to scrutinise the 
report of the Auditor General and scrutinise the annual financial 
statements and discontinue the function of producing the oversight 
report. 
b) The NMBM council should establish a stand-alone committee that 
is responsible for examining the annual report and producing the 
oversight report as per section 129 of the MFMA. 
 
 
92 
 
5.2.3 MPAC Terms of reference  
  
A written description of the NMBM MPAC terms of reference and mandate 
exists and this is in alignment with the features of the generally accepted 
public accounts committees. 
 
5.2.4 MPAC Role in relation to policy 
 
The NMBM MPAC Terms of Reference and Operational Guidelines are 
silent on whether the MPAC concerns itself with the policies of the council 
or whether it is concerned only with policy implementation.  The NMBM 
MPAC role in relation to policy is therefore not aligned to the generally 
accepted features of public accounts committees.  
 
The following recommendation is made: 
 
 The NMBM MPAC Terms of Reference and Operational 
Guidelines should succinctly state that the focus of the NMBM 
MPAC is on how policy is implemented and not on the merits of 
the policy.  
 
5.2.5 Access to persons and information  
 
With respect to access to information, the NMBM MPAC Terms of 
Reference and Operational Guidelines provide the MPAC with power to 
have unlimited access to relevant persons and information.  There is a 
requirement for more clarity on the operational arrangements between 
the MPAC and the City Manager.  
 
The following recommendation is made in this regard:  
 
 The operational arrangements in the form of a protocol 
should state that the executive director of the city department 
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under review by the NMBM MPAC be always present at any 
meeting at which matters affecting his or her department are 
being addressed. It should further be understood that the 
relevant person is in attendance as a representative of the 
City Manager and on the understanding that he or she will 
provide the NMBM MPAC with all information required without 
delay.  
 
5.2.6 Power to initiate own investigations 
 
The NMBM MPAC Terms of Reference and Operational Guidelines 
empower the committee to conduct investigations pertaining to instances 
of unauthorised, irregular or fruitless and wasteful expenditure. The 
committee is also empowered to recommend investigations that are in its 
area of competence to Council.  The NMBM MPAC does not have the 
power to initiate its own investigations but can only make a 
recommendation to the Council and is therefore not aligned to the generally 
accepted public accounts committee practices on investigations.   
 
The following recommendation is made: 
 
 The revised Terms of Reference should clearly empower the 
NMBM MPAC to initiate own investigations into matters that 
fall within its remit.  
 
5.2.7 Council endorsement for recommendations to the Executive  
 
The NMBM MPAC Terms of Reference and Operational Guidelines require 
the NMBM MPAC to report to the NMBM Council at least quarterly and 
may bring items before Council as and when necessary. The NMBM MPAC 
Terms of Reference and Operational Guidelines do not explicitly articulate 
the power of the MPAC to present recommendations for consideration by 
the Council before presentation to the executive. However, all interviewees 
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reported that when the NMBM MPAC has concluded its report with findings 
and recommendations, it is tabled in the Council for debate and approval; 
followed by its referral to the executive. In practice, the NMBM MPAC 
presents its reports with recommendations to the executive via the Council 
but this practice is not codified in the NMBM Terms of Reference and 
Operational Guidelines.   
 
The following recommendation is made: 
 
 The requirement for the NMBM MPAC reports to be tabled in 
the Council for debate and approval before being presented 
to the executive should be included in the revised terms of 
reference of the NMBM MPAC. 
 
5.2.8 Membership  
 
The membership of the NMBM MPAC excludes members of the executive 
arm of the municipality as per the provisions of the Terms of Reference of 
the NMBM MPAC and this is aligned to the generally accepted features of 
a public accounts committee. The Terms of Reference also provide for the 
appointment of members for a term of a sitting Council. The majority party 
recently transferred seven of its members serving in the NMBM MPAC to 
other Council committees and replaced them with seven new members. 
These changes are not consistent with the provisions of the NMBM MPAC 
Terms of Reference. 
 
The NMBM MPAC Terms of Reference also provide for a committee of 
thirteen members with nine, three and one members for the African 
National Congress, Democratic Alliance and Minority Parties respectively. 
However, the basis for fixing the proportions of membership on the basis of 
the specific political parties does not take into account the likely change in 
the representation of various political parties arising from the regular local 
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government election. This is not consistent with the generally accepted 
features of a public accounts committee.  
 
The following recommendations are made in this regard:  
 
 The membership of the committee is strictly limited to non-
executive members as per the provisions and terms of 
reference of the NMBM MPAC should be retained. 
 The membership from various political parties in the NMBM 
MPAC should be proportional to their representation in the 
NMBM Council. 
 The provisions for appointing members to the NMBM MPAC 
for a term of a sitting council should be retained and be 
enforced.  
 
5.2.9 Frequency of meetings  
 
The NMBM MPAC Terms of Reference provide for a minimum of 10 
meetings in a year or as may be necessary in accordance with the work 
programme. In practice, the NMBM MPAC meetings are convened at least 
once a month and three or four times a month during the consideration of 
the annual report. In addition, special meetings are held when the 
committee deems it fit.  
 
The following recommendation is made: 
 
 The existing provision for regular NMBM MPAC meetings is 
consistent with the generally accepted features of a public 
accounts committee and therefore should be retained in the 
revised terms of reference. 
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5.2.10 Public hearings  
 
The meetings of the NMBM MPAC take place in the City Hall and are open 
to the public. The practice of holding meetings that are open to the public is 
not contained in the NMBM MPAC Terms of Reference. 
 
The following recommendation is made: 
 
 The Terms of Reference of the NMBM MPAC should provide 
for committee meetings to be open to the public and the media 
with public hearings being the norm. 
 
5.2.11 Publication of reports 
 
The NMBM MPAC Terms of Reference do not have a provision that 
specifies the period within which reports have to be published. The reports 
of the NMBM MPAC are produced quickly and are published widely in 
practice, including on the NMBM website. 
 
The following recommendation is made: 
 
 The NMBM MPAC Terms of Reference should state that the 
reports of the NMBM MPAC must be printed and made public 
within thirty days after adoption of the report by the NMBM 
Council. 
 
5.2.12 Reports of the Auditor-General 
 
The primary source document for the NMBM MPAC is the annual report of 
the NMBM and not only the report of the Auditor-General. This is not 
consistent with the generally accepted practices of public accounts 
committees in which the primary focus is on the report of the Auditor-
General.  
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The following recommendation is made: 
 
 The Terms of Reference of the NMBM MPAC should specify 
that the primary source documents for the NMBM MPAC be the 
reports of the Auditor-General.  
 
5.2.13 committee chairperson  
 
There is no formal requirement that the chairperson of the The NMBM 
MPAC Terms of Reference and Operational Guidelines do not specifically 
require the MPAC chairperson to be from an opposition party. This was 
however the case in 2010 when the MPAC was established.  
 
The following recommendation is made: 
 
 The NMBM MPAC should not formally require a member of the 
opposition to be the chairperson of the committee as the NMBM 
Council is not as yet ready.  
 
5.2.14 Non-partisan operations 
 
The NMBM MPAC operates in a highly partisan environment and as a 
result, various measures were put in place to achieve a non-partisan 
approach to its business. Various measures aimed at achieving inter-party 
co-operation include some MPAC meetings being preceded by closed 
multi-party caucuses and bilateral engagements between the majority party 
and minority parties. The principle that the NMBM MPAC should operate in 
a non-partisan manner is not provided for in the NMBM MPAC Terms of 
Reference.  
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The following recommendation is made: 
 
 The principle of consensus decision-making and a non-partisan 
approach to the NMBM MPAC operations be included in the 
revised terms of reference.  
 
5.2.15 Collaboration with other oversight committees 
 
.The NMBM MPAC does not collaborate with other oversight committees 
and therefore the NMBM MPAC is not aligned to the generally accepted 
practices of public accounts committees. The NMBM council has an Audit 
Committee and does not have section 79 oversight committees. The NMBM 
MPAC collaboration could be in the form of sharing reports.   
 
The following recommendation is made: 
 
 The NMBM MPAC Terms of Reference should provide for the 
sharing of reports between the MPAC and the Audit Committee.   
 
5.2.16 Adequacy of resources 
 
The NMBM MPAC Terms of Reference and Operational Guidelines provide 
for dedicated staff members which are the Committee Co-
ordinator/Researcher, Committee Services, Internal Audit and Legal 
Division. It is not clear how Committee Services, Internal Audit and Legal 
Division are referred to as dedicated capacity for the MPAC whereas these 
are stand-alone components with specific mandates that are broader than 
the MPAC in scope. In practice, the NMBM MPAC is currently supported 
by the secretariat which is made up of two staff members who are 
responsible for preparing the agenda, issuing the meeting packs and 
drafting the minutes of the meeting. The NMBM MPAC is currently not 
receiving adequate support and as a result the support staff in the offices of 
the City Manager and the Chief Operations Officer augment the existing 
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capacity. There is a misalignment between what is provided for by the 
NMBM Council in the NMBM MPAC Terms of Reference and the practical 
reality.  
 
The NMBM MPAC requires professionally qualified staff throughout the 
year that will provide it with the capacity for addressing the core business 
of the MPAC, to review annual financial statements and the report of the 
Auditor General. Furthermore, the NMBM Chairperson is now a full-time 
councillor focussing on the MPAC responsibilities.  
 
The following recommendations are made in this regard:  
 
 The current level of resourcing of the NMBM MPAC as provided for 
in the terms of reference must be retained.   
 The NMBM should urgently attend to the leadership of the dedicated 
capacity that will provide direction to the entire team. An appointment 
of the Committee Co-ordinator/Researcher needs to be prioritised 
and be charged with a mandate of leading and co-ordinating the rest 
of the team. 
 The staff from the Committee Services, Internal Audit and Legal 
Division that are allocated to support of the NMBM MPAC should 
administratively report to the heads of those respective divisions, 
but should functionally report to the chairperson of the NMBM MPAC 
pending the appointment of the Committee Co-
ordinator/Researcher.  
 
5.2.17 Capacity building for members 
 
The NMBM MPAC Terms of Reference provide for the MPAC to facilitate 
capacity building programmes for committee members and officials to 
enable them to perform their duties. Two capacity building sessions have 
been facilitated thus far by the Association of Public Accounts Committees 
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and the Eastern Cape Department of Local Government & Traditional 
Affairs. However, there is no annual capacity building programme for 
NMBM MPAC and officials.   
 
The following recommendations are made in this regard: 
 
 The provision for the MPAC to facilitate capacity building 
programmes for committee members and officials in the current 
Terms of Reference of the NMBM MPAC should be retained. 
 The NMBM MPAC Terms of Reference to stipulate that the annual 
plan of the MPAC to entail an annual capacity building programme 
for NMBM MPAC and officials.   
 
5.2.18 Council debates on committee reports  
 
The NMBM MPAC Terms of Reference do not provide for a debate or 
discussion on the MPAC reports by the NMBM Council. In practice, 
debates do take place depending on the content of the report or the existing 
mood of the Council. The discussion of the MPAC reports by the council 
provide an opportunity for all members of the council to be aware of the key 
governance and accountability issues arising from the report.  
 
The following recommendation is made: 
 
 The current practice for the NMBM MPAC reports to be tabled 
in the Council for debate and approval should be included in 
the revised terms of reference of the NMBM MPAC. 
 
5.2.19 Executive responses to Committee reports  
 
The NMBM MPAC Terms of Reference do not provide for responses to 
the MPAC reports by the Executive Mayor or the City Manager. In practice, 
the NMBM officials are responsible for responding to the NMBM MPAC 
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reports with the timeliness and quality of responses being inadequate. The 
NMBM MPAC is not aligned to generally accepted public accounts 
committee features with respect to executive responses to PAC 
recommendations.   
 
The following recommendations are made in this regard: 
 
 The requirement for the City Manager to provide formal 
responses to the NMBM council on the MPAC reports be 
included in the revised terms of reference. The responses 
to MPAC reports be provided within two months after the 
adoption of the MPAC report by the NMBM council. The 
responses will have a standing referral to the NMBM 
MPAC by the speaker.  
 
5.2.20 Records of meetings  
 
The NMBM PMAC Terms of Reference do not provide for the keeping 
of detailed minutes or transcripts of MPAC proceedings. In practice, 
however, the records of proceedings in the form of minutes are kept by the 
NMBM MPAC in practice. However, no transcripts of the meetings are 
produced. The NMBM MPAC is not aligned to generally accepted public 
accounts committee features with respect to the keeping of the records of 
MPAC proceedings. 
 
The following recommendation is therefore made:  
 
 .The requirement for the keeping of records of MPAC proceedings 
in the form of minutes and transcripts to be included in the revised 
MPAC Terms of Reference.   
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5.2.21 Performance measurement  
 
The NMBM MPAC has no mechanism in place to measure its performance 
and has never obtained external assistance in reviewing its success in 
informing the NMBM Council about the accountability of the Municipality.  
The situation in the NMBM MPAC is consistent with the findings of 
Stapenhurst (2005, p.22) where very few committees published reports 
dealing with their own performance, or assessed their success in informing 
their legislatures about the accountability of the government. 
 
The following recommendations are made in this regard: 
 
 The NMBM MPAC should adopt a formal performance measurement 
mechanism to measure its success as a catalyst in improving the 
financial accountability of the municipality. The framework of this 
mechanism would entail an assessment of the MPAC performance 
with respect to its activities, outputs and outcomes. 
 The NMBM MPAC should assess its performance once per annum 
guided by its performance measurement mechanism. In addition, the 
NMBM MPAC should annually publish the report dealing with its 
performance.  
 
5.3 CONCLUSION  
 
The study supports the view that legislative structures such as the municipal 
councils delegate some of their authority to the executive of the municipality 
which is accountable to the municipal council for exercising its delegated 
powers and functions. The municipal council has to ensure that the 
responsibility conferred on the executive is properly fulfilled and that the 
executive has an obligation to account for how it exercises the delegated 
powers and functions. In addition to other critical roles and responsibilities, 
municipal councils are required to be the custodians of public resources at 
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the local government level and therefore they need to provide leadership on 
the stewardship of these resources.  
 
The findings of this study are expected to contribute to the body of 
knowledge regarding efforts to strengthen the role of the municipal councils 
in financial accountability. More importantly, the role and responsibilities of 
the non-executive oversight committees to enhance the council oversight 
ability to hold the executive and the administrative structures accountable 
will improve service delivery and financial governance in municipalities.  
 
The study highlighted the significant role of the municipal public accounts 
committee in assisting the Council to promote financial accountability. The 
research findings indicated that without adequate clarity on the mandate 
and the powers of the MPAC, the council will be unable to undertake all the 
necessary activities to enable effective financial accountability. Similarly, 
the study revealed the inadequacy of the NMBM Terms of Reference and 
Operational Guidelines that provide for the institutionalisation of the NMBM 
MPAC.  
 
The study highlights the importance of the proper establishment and 
institutionalisation of the MPAC as a financial oversight mechanism of the 
council. The committees must be endowed with adequate authority to 
realise their purpose. The requisite authority must be formally delegated to 
empower the committee and be sufficiently comprehensive to enable it to 
fully discharge its financial oversight mandate.  
 
A number of gaps in the practices of the NMBM MPAC were also identified 
by the research. Measures meant to close the gaps in practices would go 
a long way in improving the effectiveness of the MPAC. The study 
confirmed the need for the assessment of the performance of the MPAC 
with respect to its activities, outputs and outcomes.  
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APPENDIX  
 
Interview guide for the NMBM MPAC 
Name of Interviewee  Designation   Contact details  
 
 
 Mobile: 
E mail:  
 
Introduction and purpose 
Introduction– Researcher and participant introduce themselves  
Purpose  – summary and objectives of the interview – the participant to feel free to share experience about the NMBM MPAC, to assess 
progress and lessons in the operations of the MPAC, results to help NMBM and other SA municipalities, no answer is wrong, the interview to 
take approximately an hour; the thematic areas to be covered.  
Discussion topics  Prompts  
Background of the NMBMMPAC: When and why 
was the MPAC established? 
In hind sight, was it a good idea to establish the MPAC? 
 
 
 
What is the mandate of the MPAC? What is the 
relationship of the MPAC with the NMBM Council? 
 
 
What is the relationship of the MPAC and the Mayoral Committee? 
How does the MPAC relate with the Finance Committee and the Audit Committee? 
Is the public and the press allowed to attend MPAC sittings? 
Is the council interested in MPAC reports? 
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What are the gains or achievements of the MPAC? 
 
Are there any benefits for having an MPAC in NMBM? If so, what are they? 
Is the role of the MPAC clear to all members of the 
NMBM Council?  
Do other councillors who are not members attend MPAC meetings?  
Are there any challenges faced by your committee? 
If so, what are those challenges? 
 
How do councillors from different parties relate to the MPAC mandate? 
Is the City Manager available for MPAC meetings? 
Does the committee have access to all the relevant people and information? 
 
What are the plans to address the challenges? 
 
Are there any capacity building initiatives for committee members and the support staff? 
Are there adequate resources allocated to the committee? 
Has the Office of the Auditor General provided support to the committee? 
Who should be the leader or chairperson of the 
MPAC? Give reasons 
 
 
What is the mechanism for measuring the 
performance of the MPAC? 
Is the mechanism effective? 
What are means of measuring MPAC performance should NMBM consider? 
Conclusion  
Thank you for availing yourself for the interview and for sharing useful information and perspectives about the MPAC. I might make a follow 
up call in case there are significant gaps in my records  
 
